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INTRODUCTION 
In the recent case of Murr v. Wisconsin,1 the Supreme Court 
revisited its regulatory-takings doctrine,2 apparently limiting the reach 
of that doctrine as established in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
                                                   
 * University Professor of Law and Political Science, Vanderbilt University. 
I want to thank Lisa Bressman, June Carbone, Erwin Chemerinsky, Malcolm Feeley, 
Thomas Merrill, Andrea Peterson, Rob van Gestel, and Kevin Stack for helping me 
with the ideas that underlie this Article and the faculties of Berkeley Law School, the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Yale Law School where earlier versions 
of the Article were presented.  
 1. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).  
 2. See id. at 1937-38. 
226 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
Council.3 The decision drew two dissents, a lengthy objection by Chief 
Justice Roberts and a brief comment by Justice Thomas.4 Remarkably, 
given the fact that they were dissents and the prevailing view about 
the political alignments of their authors, both were based on premises 
that would undermine significant portions of the doctrine. Together 
with the majority opinion, which offered only a confused explanation 
of its own holding and of its reason for distinguishing Lucas, the case 
reveals a deep conceptual instability in the Court’s regulatory-takings 
jurisprudence.5 
This Article argues that “regulatory takings” is in fact two 
separate doctrines. The difference between the two depends on 
whether the alleged taking is a government action directed against a 
specific piece of property6 or an action that affects a significant 
number of properties in the same essential way.7 The requirement that 
                                                   
 3. See id. at 1946-47; see generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003 (1992).  
 4. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950-57 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 1957-
58 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 5. This seems to be a matter of consensus among early commentators. See 
Maureen E. Brady, Penn Central Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr v. 
Wisconsin Mean for Property Federalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 70 (2017) 
(suggesting that the decision introduces “a bad variable . . . [into] the equation” for 
determining compensation issues); Richard A. Epstein, Disappointed Expectations: 
How the Supreme Court Failed to Clean Up Takings Law in Murr v. Wisconsin, 11 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 151, 215 (2017) (stating that the decision establishes “a facts-
and-circumstances test that is all too malleable in individual cases and gives no 
guidance to landowners as to which regulations can be imposed without 
compensation”); Nicole Stelle Garnett, From a Muddle to a Mudslide: Murr v. 
Wisconsin, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 131, 139 (2017) (stating that the decision “replaces 
one of the few clarifying principles in the regulatory takings muddle” with a 
“subjective and unpredictable” test). 
 6. Of course, the government entity that carries out a specific regulatory 
taking, such as a planning commission or an environmental protection agency, will 
typically be authorized to act by some general provision of law. But the action itself, 
as carried out by the authorized entity, is directed against a specific piece of property. 
Virtually all the regulatory-takings cases, both general and specific, come from the 
states; thus, the nature of this authorization will be a matter of state law and is typically 
not subject to control by the federal constitution. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 
U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (endorsing the so-called Dillon Rule, which holds that local 
governments are creatures of the state); see generally Richard Briffault, Our 
Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(1990); Richard Briffualt, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990). 
 7. The distinction is a familiar one and has been discussed by commentators 
as an element or consideration of various prudential tests that have been proposed for 
determining whether government actions should be considered a compensable taking. 
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
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the government compensate property owners for specific regulatory 
takings relies on the Due Process Clause and on its dependent and 
subsidiary Takings Clause.8 It thus has a valid constitutional basis, 
although the extent of the government’s obligation to compensate will 
depend on various additional factors.9  
The second and smaller category of decisions, initiated by 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon10 and represented in modern law by 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,11 Lucas, and now 
Murr, cannot rely on the Due Process and Takings Clauses as they are 
currently interpreted. The reason is that these clauses apply to 
procedures, that is, to government action against specified persons. To 
strike down regulatory laws of general application, a substantive 
principle, such as free speech or free exercise of religion, is required. 
Where property is concerned, the substantive principle cannot be 
found in the text of the Constitution.12 Instead, that principle is 
substantive due process––the use of the Due Process Clause to extend 
protection to interests not identified in the constitutional text. 
Substantive due process is alive and well, of course; the Supreme 
Court recently relied on it, and indeed enthusiastically endorsed it, in 
                                                   
EMINENT DOMAIN 93-104 (1985); see also John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a 
Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003 (2003); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the 
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); William Michael Treanor, The Original 
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
782 (1995). The argument here is that the distinction, although supported by 
prudential considerations is primarily doctrinal. See infra Part IV. Its basic conclusion 
is that general regulatory action is not subject to the Takings Clause but rather a matter 
for the political process to determine. See infra Part IV. 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 9. The Fifth Amendment contains an additional requirement, which is that 
the property is being taken for “public use.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. This has been the 
subject of great controversy in recent years due to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), which allowed a local government 
to transfer property obtained through eminent domain to a private developer on the 
basis of the benefit to the community that the developer’s project would produce. See 
generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 
(1986). Public use is an independent requirement for a valid taking and thus lies 
outside the scope of this Article. The question does not arise in most regulatory-
takings cases. But see generally Jed Rubinfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077 (1993) 
(proposing to reinterpret the public use requirement to resolve uncertainties in takings 
doctrine by distinguishing between cases when the government impedes the owner’s 
use of the property). 
 10. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 11. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 12. See Merrill, supra note 9, at 115. 
228 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
Obergefell v. Hodges.13 But it no longer applies to economic interests, 
such as the general contours of property rights.14 That doctrine was 
definitively rejected in 1937,15 and there is no sign that it will be 
revived. In other words, the general regulatory-takings cases rest on 
the repudiated doctrine of economic due process. 
To clarify, the term “property rights” often refers to the set of 
legal rights established by positive law.16 There can be little dispute 
that such rights are crucial for a modern economy and for modern 
people’s sense of well-being.17 Another possible meaning is that a 
person’s property cannot be taken away by the state except under 
specified conditions, specifically a showing that positive and generally 
applicable law has authorized such action or, in the absence of that 
showing, with compensation for the value of the taken property.18 That 
is the due process right that supports constitutionally imposed limits 
on specific regulatory takings. Although the scope of this right is open 
to debate,19 there can be equally little doubt that the right itself is 
                                                   
 13. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015) (striking 
down state laws that restrict a person’s choice of spouse on the basis of gender). The 
Court might have decided the case on Equal Protection grounds, thereby avoiding 
reliance on substantive due process doctrine. Instead, it based the opinion on 
substantive due process, beginning with a ringing reaffirmation of it: “The 
Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain 
specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their 
identity.” Id. at 2593. 
 14. See generally United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); W. 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 15. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 148; W. Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 
398. 
 16. See Merrill, supra note 9, at 115 (discussing how the Constitution does 
not create property rights). 
 17. See Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 
CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 130 (2002) (discussing the long and contentious history of 
property rights in the United States). 
 18. See Merrill, supra note 9, at 115 (discussing the role of state law in 
defining takings for private use). 
 19. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 120 (1995) (noting that governments often protect property 
rights, but courts must intercede where property owners are politically 
disadvantaged); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 102 (arguing that courts have 
permitted governments to interfere with many property rights that should be protected 
from diminution); Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 
INT’L REV. L & ECON. 125, 125 (1992) (using public choice analysis to conclude that 
legislators will typically compensate landowners, and that legal requirements simply 
add certainty and predictability); Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: 
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. 
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essential for anything that we would recognize as a just society.20 But 
neither of these versions of property rights can support general 
regulatory-takings doctrine because the scope of both types of rights 
depends on positive law, either to create the legal right to property or 
to define the property to which the constitutional due process right 
attaches.21 General regulatory-takings doctrine operates as a limit or 
constraint on positive law.22 It invalidates certain positive laws that 
decrease the value of people’s property and do not provide 
compensation for that loss.23 Thus, it necessarily relies on the idea that 
there is a “right to property” that limits the reach of positive law when 
private property is being affected.24  
The impression that such a right exists in our legal system 
typically arises from the assumption that common law has 
independent authority: that it can, by its own force, constrain the 
power of the state to create, alter, or abolish property rights through 
positive law.25 This was the basis for the Lochner Court’s economic 
due process doctrine, which struck down a variety of Progressive Era 
enactments.26 It possesses intuitive appeal because common law is in 
fact the source of traditional property law rules.27 For some, it gains 
additional appeal from their hostility toward administrative 
governance, because that is the mechanism by which common-law 
property rules have been displaced. This assumption tends to be left 
unstated, however, because it is no longer an accepted legal doctrine. 
Economic due process doctrine is therefore incapable of generating a 
right to private property in the sense that would support the general 
regulatory-takings decisions. 
                                                   
REV. 1165, 1212-14 (1967) (arguing that the takings doctrine involves a balance of 
fairness and economic efficiency). 
 20. See infra Section II.B-III.A (discussing the scope and rationale of the Due 
Process Clause). 
 21. See Merrill, supra note 9, at 115 (discussing how property rights are 
defined by independent sources of positive law). 
 22. See Holly Doremus, Takings and Transition, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. 
L. 1, 3 (2003). 
 23. See id. (discussing how takings claims operate). 
 24. See Fee, supra note 7, at 1004 (describing how takings law affects private 
property). 
 25. See id. at 1016 (discussing the role of the common law in takings 
jurisprudence). 
 26. See id. at 1027 (explaining that a court’s decision must be grounded in a 
“consistent definition of private property” to avoid classification as Lochnerian); see 
generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 27. See Fee, supra note 7, at 1016 (explaining the common law is the source 
of traditional property law). 
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A consequence of relying on the now repudiated right to 
economic due process is that the general regulatory-takings decisions 
that the Court has reached are incoherent.28 Of course, many of the 
Court’s decisions are subject to this criticism; given the high profile 
and controversial nature of Supreme Court cases, such criticism is 
probably inevitable. But in the general regulatory-takings cases, a 
specific type of incoherence can be identified––one that is directly 
related to their lack of any valid legal foundation.29 This is the failure 
of the decisions to distinguish, in any principled or even 
comprehensible way, between property that is protected by the 
doctrine and property that is not so protected and thus can be reduced 
in value by positive law without requiring compensation for the 
owner. Because there is no right to property in the form on which the 
Court is necessarily relying, the distinctions that the Court has 
attempted to articulate between protected and unprotected property are 
built on sand and collapse when subjected to analysis.  
Part I of this Article delineates the distinction between specific 
regulatory actions and general regulatory actions. Part II explains that 
constitutional restrictions on general regulatory actions are not based 
on any recognized constitutional right. Instead, they are a form of 
economic due process, a repudiated doctrine. Part III discusses some 
of the Court’s best-known regulatory takings cases, specifically 
Mahon, Loretto, and Lucas, as well as Murr. It shows how these cases 
fail to distinguish protected from unprotected property and how that 
failure is attributable to the absence of any right that could support 
such a distinction. Part IV argues that abolishing general regulatory-
takings doctrine should not be a cause of alarm or concern. The 
doctrine does not protect any type of property nor any group of people 
that we regard as meriting special solicitude.  
I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SPECIFIC AND GENERAL 
REGULATORY TAKINGS 
The term “regulatory taking” typically refers to a government 
action that diminishes the value of a piece of property but does not 
transfer title or control of any portion of that property.30 In Tahoe-
                                                   
 28. See Doremus, supra note 22, at 1. 
 29. See id. at 1-2 (explaining that even the Supreme Court recognizes the 
incoherence of takings doctrine jurisprudence). 
 30. The terminology is not precise. Some of the cases that involve 
compensable reductions in value involve government action that is in no sense 
regulatory. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 (1946) (requiring 
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Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,31 the 
Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, distinguished regulatory 
takings from physical or direct takings and argued that different rules 
should apply to each category.32 The argument here, however, groups 
together physical takings and one type of regulatory taking, a specific 
taking, as types of government action that are eligible for 
compensation under the Due Process and Takings Clauses. It 
distinguishes them from general regulatory takings that are not eligible 
for compensation under any constitutional provision. The distinction, 
in other words, is based on doctrinal rather than prudential or 
economic considerations. 
The prevailing test in current law for determining whether a 
regulatory taking has occurred, and thus whether compensation is 
required, was articulated by the Supreme Court in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York.33 But the criteria established 
by this decision––generally called the Penn Central test––were 
formulated in the context of a specific regulatory taking and make 
sense only in that context. Most of the regulatory-takings cases that 
the Supreme Court has decided belong in this same category of 
specific takings. The Penn Central test and its various applications 
have been the subject of considerable controversy,34 but that issue will 
                                                   
compensation when airplane landing patterns destroyed the value of a farm); see also 
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 179 (1872) (requiring 
compensation when construction of a dam inadvertently flooded nearby land). The 
argument here does not depend on whether the taking is truly regulatory, however, 
but only whether it results from general or specific government action. 
 31. See generally Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 32. See id. at 321-30. The rationale for the distinction is, first, that direct 
takings involve a greater interference with property than regulatory takings and, 
second, that compensation for regulatory takings would constitute an excessive 
burden on land use planning and other public functions. See id. at 324; Andrea L. 
Peterson, The False Dichotomy Between Physical and Regulatory Takings Analysis: 
A Critique of Tahoe-Sierra’s Distinction Between Physical and Regulatory Takings, 
34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 381, 384 (2007). For a critique of this distinction, see Fee, supra 
note 7, at 1026-27 (arguing that the distinction lacks “plausible textual legitimacy”). 
 33. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978) (setting forth a judicial test for regulatory takings). 
 34. See D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 471, 471 (2002) (arguing test has produced widespread confusion); 
Doremus, supra note 22, at 7 (explaining that although the test has been repeated 
many times, the Court has “never refined the meaning of [its] factors, or explained 
how they should be weighed”); Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Part Penn Central 
Regulatory Takings Test, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 601, 602 (2014) (arguing test is “a 
compilation of moving parts that are neither individually coherent nor collectively 
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not be addressed here. Instead, this Part will simply note that most of 
these cases are distinguishable from the smaller number of decisions 
that found general regulatory takings. The following Part will then 
explain why the specific regulatory-takings cases rest upon a valid 
constitutional foundation, regardless of whether they interpret that 
foundation correctly, while the general regulatory-takings cases lack 
any such foundation.35 
In Penn Central, New York City’s Landmarks Preservation 
Commission, acting pursuant to statutory authorization, prohibited the 
Penn Central Transportation Company from utilizing the air rights 
above Grand Central Terminal.36 The Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Brennan, explained the procedure by which the Commission issued its 
prohibition.37 Commission staff identified the Terminal as meeting the 
criteria established by law for assigning landmark status to a 
structure.38 The Commission then held a public hearing on the staff 
recommendation and, after the hearing, designated the Terminal as a 
landmark.39 Several months later, Penn Central applied to the 
Commission for permission to use the air rights above the terminal to 
build a fifty-three or fifty-five story structure.40 The Commission 
                                                   
compatible”); John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 J. ENVTL. L. 171, 
173 (2005) (explaining test is based on valid principles but needs to be revised); 
FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 49-51 (maintaining test is so vague as to be of little use and 
makes no economic sense); Gary Lawson, Katherine A. Ferguson & Guillermo A. 
Montero, “Oh Lord, Please Don’t’ Let Me Be Understood!”: Rediscovering the 
Mathews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks,” 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 48 
(2005) (describing how the test is reasonably successful in framing debate about 
regulatory impacts on property); Merrill, supra note 9, at 93 (arguing the test’s 
reliance on totality of the circumstances “masks intellectual bankruptcy”); Andrea L. 
Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 
1299, 1316 (1989) (arguing test is vague and has been applied so inconsistently that 
it provides no comprehensible guidance); Poirier, supra note 17, at 100 (explaining 
that test allows for necessary flexibility regarding regulatory takings). 
 35. See infra Part II. 
 36. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 108-09.  
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. at 110. The criteria, as quoted by the Court, are that the structure 
has “a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of the 
development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the city, state or nation.” Id. While 
an area of the city can be given landmark status, these criteria, when applied to a single 
structure such as Grand Central Station, are necessarily specific to that structure. 
 39. See id. at 115-16. This decision was confirmed, as the law required, by 
the New York City Board of Estimate. See id. at 116. 
 40. See id. at 116-17. The application was filed by both the Penn Central 
Transportation Co. and UGP Properties, Inc., with whom Penn Central had entered 
into a renewable 50-year lease. See id. at 116. Both companies were appellants in the 
Supreme Court case. See id. at 118-19. 
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denied the request, stating that the proposed addition would destroy 
the historic character of the Terminal.41 As is evident from this cursory 
description, the entire procedure was an effort to determine the status 
of a specific building and displayed features such as a hearing and 
appeal that are associated with such individualized determinations. 
In asserting its claim that the prohibition amounted to a taking, 
Penn Central repeatedly relied on the fact that its property had been 
“singled out” by the Commission,42 and Justice Rehnquist’s dissent 
began by using the same term.43 In other words, Penn Central was not 
challenging the constitutionality of the Landmarks Commission itself, 
or the criteria that guided its decision, but rather was challenging the 
application of those criteria to its particular property. The Court 
conceded this point and denied relief on the ground that the 
Commission was not acting arbitrarily but according to the established 
criteria.44 It began its explanation of the principles applicable to such 
criteria with a caveat: “[W]hether a particular restriction will be 
rendered invalid by the government’s failure to pay for any losses 
proximately caused by it depends largely ‘upon the particular 
circumstances [in that] case.’”45 The Court then articulated its three-
part test: “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,” 
“the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations,” and “the character of the 
government action,” particularly whether “interference with property 
can be characterized as a physical invasion by government.”46 It 
                                                   
 41. See id. at 117. 
 42. Id. at 131 (“[A]ppellants’ position appears to be that the only means of 
ensuring that selected owners are not singled out to endure financial hardship . . . is to 
[provide] . . . compensation.”); see id. at 132 (explaining appellants claimed that 
landmark laws require compensation for economic loss because they “apply only to 
selected parcels.”); id. (discussing that appellants claimed that landmark designation 
is “‘arbitrary[,] or at least subjective, because it is basically a matter of taste’ . . . thus 
unavoidably singling out individual landowners for disparate and unfair treatment”); 
id. at 133 (explaining that appellants’ assert that “the Landmarks Law does not impose 
identical or similar restrictions on all structures located in particular physical 
communities”).  
 43. Id. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Of the over one million buildings 
and structures in the city of New York, appellees have singled out 400 for designation 
as official landmarks.”); id. at 140 (“Where a relatively few individual buildings, all 
separated from one another, are singled out and treated differently from surrounding 
buildings . . . .”). 
 44. See id. at 130-35.  
 45. Id. at 124 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cent. Eureka 
Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)). 
 46. Id. at 124.  
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concluded that no compensation was required in the particular 
circumstances of the case, which included the owner’s ability to use 
the building for its existing purposes and the possibility that some 
other use of the air rights might be approved by the Commission in the 
future.47 
The Penn Central test was thus designed to deal with the claim 
of a specific regulatory taking, that is, the air rights above a single 
building.48 Whatever the value of this test when applied in such a 
specific situation, it is a bad fit when applied to general regulation. To 
begin with the initial caveat that the Court declared, “the particular 
circumstances” are necessarily of central importance in a specific 
regulatory-takings case because the scope and economic impact of the 
government’s action will necessarily depend upon the effect of the 
regulation on the piece of property in question.49 When the 
government enacts a general regulation, however, there needs to be 
some overall standard to determine whether it is valid against all the 
property owners to which it applies. In this context, the Court’s 
insistence that particular circumstances control each potential 
challenge is not a recognition of reality but an admission of defeat. 
Penn Central’s three criteria are equally problematic when 
applied to general governmental action. The first, namely the 
economic impact on the plaintiff, sounds reasonable but suffers from 
an ambiguity. If it is essentially a synonym for the market value of the 
property, it is a correct, although perhaps overly simplified, statement 
of the law,50 but then there would seem to be no reason not to utilize 
                                                   
 47. See id. at 136-37. 
 48. See id. at 135-36. 
 49. Id. at 124 (quoting Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. at 168). 
 50. Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation 
for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. L. REV. 677, 678 (2005) (“For all the disagreement 
and uncertainty in the rest of takings jurisprudence, compensation is considered 
straightforward; it is measured by the fair market value of the property taken.”). In 
fact, there is a substantial amount of controversy about both the way that market value 
is to be determined and whether it provides a fair or efficient measure of value. See 
FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 325-67 (noting various factors that affect the level of 
compensation); Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: 
An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 571 (1984) (using economic analysis 
to argue that compensation should be treated as a form of insurance against regulatory 
risk); Yun-chien Chang, Economic Value or Fair Market Value: What Form of 
Takings Compensation is Efficient?, 20 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 35, 38-39 (2012) 
(arguing that fair market value compensation is inefficient and should be 
supplemented by bonuses for residential owners, but that it is efficient for non-
residential owners); Hanoch Dagan, Taking and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 
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the more familiar term. If it means that the existence of a taking will 
depend on how severely the property owner is affected, it seems 
incorrect. The right that the Takings Clause protects is not a right to 
suffer only limited damage from governmental action but rather a right 
to the value of the property that has been taken. Typically, just 
compensation means the market value of the property, whether the 
property is the sole asset of an individual or an infinitesimal fraction 
of a giant corporation’s total assets. It would be a clear violation of 
current doctrine and, in fact, of our overall conception of legal rights, 
to deny compensation to a property owner on the ground that the 
owner is so wealthy that its loss of a particular property has little 
economic impact on it. 
“[D]istinct investment-backed expectations” is also of 
questionable applicability when general governmental action is 
involved.51 In this context, it would create a formidable disincentive 
against changing public policy. It is one thing to take the owner’s 
expectations into account when valuing a particular piece of property 
that the government has decided to appropriate, but it would be quite 
another thing to lock public policy in place by requiring compensation 
for the expectations of the market or the general public. Finally, the 
reference to invasion seems appropriate for transfer of title, the typical 
form of an individualized taking, rather than for general regulations, 
which can rarely be characterized in this manner. While some 
regulations might be regarded as physical invasions, many leave the 
property unaltered and simply restrict some future change or use.52 
The Court seems to have recognized the difficulty in applying 
the Penn Central test to general regulatory takings in Lingle v. 
Chevron, U.S.A. Inc.53 The case involved a challenge to a state statute 
that placed limits on the rental amount that an oil company could 
charge its lessees who operated service stations.54 The Court of 
Appeals sustained the challenge on the basis of language in an earlier 
case, Agins v. City of Tiburon.55 In Agins, the Court rejected a claim 
                                                   
741, 743 (1999) (arguing for a progressive compensation approach that would 
incorporate considerations of distributive justice). 
 51. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
 52. The exception is Loretto, where this language was at least conceivably 
relevant. See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419 (1982). Its relevance may have been a factor in the Court’s decision in that case. 
See infra notes 226-247 and accompanying text. 
 53. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539, 548 (2005). 
 54. See id. at 528. 
 55. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
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that a zoning ordinance constituted a taking that required 
compensation but declared, in reaching its decision, that “[t]he 
application of a general zoning law to a particular property effects a 
taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state 
interests.”56 The Lingle decision unanimously upheld the statutory 
rental limitation, thereby reversing the lower court, but also overruled 
or perhaps excised the “substantially advances” language used in 
Agins.57 That language, the Court pointed out, was a reversion to 
Lochner Era jurisprudence, when federal courts used the Due Process 
Clause to assert that the constitutionality of generally applicable 
economic regulation depended on whether it served a legitimate public 
purpose.58 Such an inquiry, the Court said, was, in fact, “derived from 
due process, not takings, precedents.”59 The Court followed this 
principle in concluding that the “substantially advances” test, 
whatever its validity, had no relevance to takings doctrine.60 
Instead, the Court held, takings challenges, at least in the 
regulatory context, are to be evaluated by use of the Penn Central 
test.61 However, the Court declared there are “two categories of 
regulatory action that generally will be deemed per se takings for Fifth 
Amendment purposes.”62 These are “where [the] government requires 
an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property—
however minor,” as exemplified by the decision in Loretto and where 
the government enacts “regulations that completely deprive an owner 
of ‘all economically beneficial us[e],’” as exemplified by Lucas.63 But 
“[o]utside these two relatively narrow categories,” the Lingle Court 
declared, the Penn Central test should control.64 The Court was thus 
aware that its two leading general regulatory-takings decisions were 
in some sense anomalous. Further, in the course of writing an opinion 
that clearly distinguished between the Due Process Clause analysis of 
economic regulation––which it rejected––and the Takings Clause 
analysis of regulatory action––which it clarified––the Court limited 
                                                   
 56. Id. 
 57. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548. 
 58. Id. at 540-42. 
 59. Id. at 540. The Court was referring to the idea that the compensation 
provided when property is taken by the state is an alternative to due process, not an 
aspect of it, as will be discussed below. See infra Section III.A. 
 60. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545. 
 61. See id. at 528. 
 62. Id. at 538. 
 63. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003 (1992)). 
 64. Id. 
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the scope of these anomalous decisions and endorsed the test it had 
developed in Penn Central.65 What the Court failed to do is explain 
why it had recognized the exceptions, that is, why physical invasion 
and eliminating all the economic value of a property justified 
extending a doctrine derived from specific governmental action to 
general governmental action.  
The Lingle Court was accurate, however, in stating that 
decisions requiring compensation for general regulatory takings are 
exceptional.66 The great majority of regulatory cases that have required 
compensation, both before and after Penn Central, have involved 
specific action. Typical examples are: Nollan v. California Coastal 
Committee, where the property owner was required to grant an 
easement across beachfront property as a condition for receiving a 
permit to rebuild a house on the property; 67 Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, where a developer that converted a private pond into a marina 
was required to grant public access to the marina as a navigable 
waterway;68 and United States v. Causby, where routing airplane 
landings over a chicken farm destroyed the value of the farm.69 In 
contrast, losses caused by regulatory action that affects groups of 
                                                   
 65. See id. at 536-45. 
 66. See id. at 538. 
 67. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987); see also 
Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 611 (2013) (holding that 
granting a property owner permission to develop his property only if he paid for 
improvements unrelated to the property constituted a taking). The decision has been 
criticized as an extreme interpretation of the Takings Clause. See, e.g., id. at 626 
(Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Andrew W. Schwartz, No Competing Theory of 
Constitutional Interpretation Justifies Regulatory Takings Ideology, 34 STAN. ENVTL. 
L.J. 247, 290-92 (2015). In any event, this case also involves action taken against one 
specific property. See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 599. 
 68. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (“The 
Government contends that as a result of one of these improvements, the pond’s 
connection to the navigable water in a manner approved by the Corps of Engineers, 
the owner has somehow lost one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights 
that are commonly characterized as property—the right to exclude others.”). 
 69. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259, 261 (1946). The distinction 
is particularly clear in this pre-Penn Central case. The Court, per Justice Douglas, 
noted: “The airplane is part of the modern environment of life, and the inconveniences 
which it causes are normally not compensable under the Fifth Amendment. The 
airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public 
domain.” Id. at 266. But it went on to conclude that flights over private land constitute 
a taking if they are “so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference 
with the enjoyment and use of the land.” Id. In other words, airplane noise that affects 
large groups of people is not a taking, however annoying, but distinctive damage to a 
particular property is a taking that requires compensation. 
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people are generally not regarded as takings and thus do not require 
compensation for any economic losses that the regulation causes.70 
Examples include a zoning law that decreases the economic value of 
all property within a given area,71 a welfare law that shifts child 
support payments from private parties to the government,72 and a 
restriction on mining coal in a way that would cause subsidence of the 
surface land above the mine.73 The Penn Central court, however, 
confused this issue by citing, in support of its conclusion, holdings in 
cases challenging general regulatory action.74 To be sure, the decisions 
                                                   
 70. One other exception to the pattern of modern Takings Clause cases that 
limits the compensation requirement to individualized action is Webb’s Fabulous 
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1980). Upon learning that the 
firm it had purchased had debts greater than the purchase price, Eckerd’s filed a 
complaint of interpleader in state court that named the purchased firm and its creditors 
and tendered the purchase price to the court. See id. at 156-57. The clerk of the court 
deposited the money in an interest-bearing account. See id. at 157. When the 
interpleader fund was transmitted to the receiver, the court retained, pursuant to 
statute, not only the prescribed court fee, but also the interest on the fund. See id. at 
158. The Supreme Court held that the interest was private property and that the state 
court’s retention of the interest constituted an uncompensated taking. See id. at 164-
65. In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court acknowledged that property is 
created by state law. See id. at 161. The court held that state law defined the interest 
as belonging to Webb’s creditors. See id. at 164. Retaining the interest is “analogous 
to the appropriation of the use of private property in [Causby].”  Id. 
Causby, however, involved an individualized action. See 328 U.S. at 258. In 
Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, the state court acted pursuant to statute. See 449 U.S. 
at 164-65. The action involved, however, has a sort of random, particularized feel to 
it; Webb’s creditors were denied the interest because Eckerd’s purchase price 
happened to fall into the control of the court, rather than being dealt with through 
some other mechanism. See id. at 156-57. In addition, the statute’s operation may raise 
procedural due process concerns; it appears as a kind of penalty for making use of the 
judicial system. The possibility that these additional concerns led the Supreme Court 
to require compensation for action taken pursuant to a general statute is further 
suggested by its subsequent rulings in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 
U.S. 156, 160 (1998) and Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 
220 (2003). These cases concerned state legislation providing that interest on client 
funds that lawyers hold in trust can be taken by the state to support legal services when 
the amounts involved are too small to be conveniently returned to the client (so-called 
IOLTA programs). See Brown, 538 U.S. at 220; Phillips, 524 U.S. at 159-60. In 
Phillips, the Court felt compelled to follow Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies and hold 
that the interest was property, 524 U.S. at 172, but in Brown it declined to grant 
compensation because the clients had lost nothing of value. 538 U.S. at 240-41. 
 71. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395-97 (1926) 
(prohibiting industrial use of property). 
 72. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 605 (1987). 
 73. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 
501-02 (1987). 
 74. See Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124-28. 
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deny compensation, but they do so on a different basis than the denial 
in Penn Central, which, as just described, was an action taken against, 
or singling out, an individual property. 
II. RESTRICTIONS ON GENERAL LAWS AFFECTING PROPERTY AS 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
A. The Absence of a General Right to Property in the Constitution 
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution implicitly assumed that the 
rules regarding private property would be subject to the authority of 
government. Because the national government they were creating had 
only delimited or enumerated powers, and those powers did not extend 
to most legal relations among citizens, the Framers did not need to 
assert any general authority to determine property rules. But they did 
not hesitate to grant the national legislature plenary authority over 
property rights in those areas where they deemed national authority 
appropriate.75 These included, at the least, interstate commerce, 
commerce with the Indian tribes, bankruptcy, copyrights, and 
patents.76  
In leaving most legal relations among citizens under the control 
of the states, the Framers were of course aware that these relations 
would be governed by English common law. At the time of the 
Constitutional Convention, the states had been exercising control over 
legal relations for over a decade and none had displaced the common 
law that the colonial courts had applied.77 But the Framers were also 
aware that the states had full authority to enact legislation changing 
common law, and that this could include the rules regarding private 
property.78 The Constitution that they drafted made no effort to place 
any restriction on state authority to do so.  
This is a notable absence because the document contains a 
provision, Article I, § 10, that places an extensive series of other 
restrictions on the scope of state legislation.79 It prohibits states from 
                                                   
 75. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3-4, 8. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 79-81 (3d ed. 
2005).  
 78. See id. at 167-81. 
 79. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10. There can be little question that ideas about 
natural law and natural rights were widely discussed among the Framers. See 
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 185-98 
(enlarged ed. 1992); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN 
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 288-338 (1996); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the 
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entering into treaties, coining money, issuing bills of credit or paper 
money, passing ex post facto laws and bills of attainder, granting titles 
of nobility, imposing import or export duties, and waging war or 
maintaining troops in time of peace.80 The Clause ventures into 
commercial matters as well by prohibiting states from passing any 
“law impairing the obligation of contracts,” a matter that will be 
discussed below.81 If the Framers had believed that there should be 
limits on the government’s authority to control and alter the common-
law rules regarding private property, this was certainly the place to say 
it, but they declined to do so. 
In fact, the original Constitution uses the word property only 
once. Article IV, § 3, Clause 2 states: “The Congress shall have power 
to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the 
territory or other property belonging to the United States . . . .”82 It is 
notable that the original Constitution’s only reference to property is an 
assertion of governmental power, not a protection of private rights.83 
Reference to private property appeared in the Constitution when 
the Bill of Rights was added; the Fifth Amendment states that no 
person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”84 This provision was based on English precedent; due 
process had been recognized as a constraint on governmental action 
for six hundred years, since Magna Carta.85 Like the Bill of Rights in 
general, it was originally applicable only to the federal government, 
                                                   
Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 
STAN. L. REV. 843, 843 (1978); see generally LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS: A HISTORY (2007) (development of human rights concepts during the 
eighteenth century). But if the Framers thought that property rights belonged in this 
category, and merited special protection, one would expect to see that view reflected 
in the constitutional text. 
 80. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10. 
 81. See id.; infra notes 141-50 and accompanying text. 
 82. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 83. James Ely concedes this point in his spirited defense of private property 
as a constitutional norm. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER 
RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 46 (1992) (the original 
Constitution contained “no language that broadly affirmed the right of property. 
Unlike many of the early state constitutions, the federal Constitution did not proclaim 
the natural right of property ownership”). 
 84. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 85. For the history of the document itself, see J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 78-
79 (1992). For the historical background, see STEPHEN CHURCH, KING JOHN: AND THE 
ROAD TO MAGNA CARTA (2015). See also DAN JONES, MAGNA CARTA: THE BIRTH OF 
LIBERTY (2015). For its influence on American law, see A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE 
ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 
(1968).  
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but it became the first Bill of Rights provision to be applied to the 
states through what became known as the incorporation doctrine.86  
As its language clearly indicates, the Due Process Clause does 
not create any rights to private property or place any restrictions on 
the government’s ability to alter the rules by which property is created, 
transferred, or destroyed. What it says is that the government may not 
impose any disadvantage on an individual, including the deprivation 
of property that the individual possesses, in accordance with some 
other legal rule, unless it follows due process, that is, proper 
procedures.87 Its appearance in Magna Carta predates the institution of 
jury trials in England by several months,88 but that procedure, as it 
developed over time, became recognized as the model of due 
process.89 
The basic and generally familiar concept that underlies this 
provision is that the government, either by positive legislation or by 
delegation to other officials such as common law judges or 
administrative agencies, enacts general rules. Many of these rules 
subject groups of people to a restriction or a disadvantage: individuals 
who knowingly buy cocaine will go to prison, butchers must pay a 
special tax. The due process right then requires the government to use 
                                                   
 86. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 237 
(1897). The Court did not explain the doctrinal basis for its decision at the time but 
only in a subsequent opinion. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1908). 
With respect to the other Bill of Rights provisions, see generally Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise Clause); Gitlow v. 
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating the Free Speech Clause). On 
incorporation generally, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 181-230 (2000) 
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the entire Bill of Rights, but 
only some Bill of Rights provisions establish individual rights while others protect the 
states). See also MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986) (arguing the Fourteenth Amendment 
was intended to incorporate the entire Bill of Rights). 
 87. See Edward L. Rubin, The Illusion of Property as a Right and Its Reality 
as an Imperfect Alternative, 2013 WISC. L. REV. 573, 585-86 (2013). 
 88. Magna Carta was promulgated in June, 1215. At the time, the ordinary 
mode of proof was the ordeal. See ROBERT BARTLETT, TRIAL BY FIRE AND WATER: 
THE MEDIEVAL JUDICIAL ORDEAL 1 (1986). It was displaced as a result of the canons 
promulgated by the Fourth Council of the Lateran, which convened in November of 
that year. See id. at 1, 53. The reference to the “lawful judgment of his peers” in 
Chapter 39 probably refers to the procedure specified in Chapter 61, that is, the Court 
of Twenty-Five. See Holt, supra note 85, at 78-80, 327-31. The “law of the land” 
means the recently established common law. See id. at 328. 
 89. See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL 
TRIAL 1 (2003); FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, VOL 1, at 144 -56 (1952) [1898]. 
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specified procedures to demonstrate that a particular individual falls 
within the legally established group before it can impose the legally 
enacted disadvantage on that individual. The individual cannot 
challenge the general rule criminalizing cocaine on the basis of the 
Due Process Clause, but he can argue that he himself did not know 
that the nature of the substance that he purchased. The butcher cannot 
challenge the state’s authority to impose the tax, but she can assert that 
she does not belong in the group subject to the tax, as defined by the 
taxing statute, because she sells only veggie burgers. Thus, the Due 
Process Clause is similar in effect to the Bill of Attainder Clause in 
Article I, § 10 of the original Constitution in that it forbids the 
government from enacting legislation that singles out an individual for 
disadvantageous treatment.90  
This understanding of the Due Process Clause was articulated in 
two Supreme Court cases, Londoner v. Denver91 and Bi-Metallic 
Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization,92 ironically decided at 
the height of the Lochner Era. In Londoner, the City of Denver 
assessed a tax on property owners who benefitted directly from an 
improvement to the street on which their property was located.93 The 
City declared, in effect, that each particular assessment was conclusive 
and declined to grant the property owners a hearing on whether the 
amount of the tax on each one had been assessed in accordance with 
the law.94 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that denying them 
such a hearing violated the Due Process Clause.95 A few years later, 
the State of Colorado enacted a law increasing the valuation of all 
taxable property in Denver by 40%.96 In response to a claim that 
property owners had been denied a hearing that would enable them to 
contest the tax, the Court held that no hearing was required because 
the tax applied generally to all the property in Denver.97 Writing for 
the majority, Justice Holmes declared: “General statutes within the 
state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, 
                                                   
 90. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 91. See generally Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).  
 92. See Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 
441, 443-44 (1915). 
 93. See Londoner, 210 U.S. at 373. 
 94. See id. at 374-76. 
 95. See id. at 386. 
 96. See Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 443-44. There is, of course, the lurking worry 
that the issue would not have been so crisply decided had not these contrasting 
enactments involved the same city and the same area of law.  
 97. See id. at 445. 
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sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be 
heard.”98  
The distinction is strongly supported by the basic theory of 
representative democracy. Because they must be elected to gain or 
retain their positions, policy makers in a representative democracy 
need to be attentive to the views of their constituents. This enables 
groups of people to influence their representatives but also means that 
they must accept the possibility that other groups will be more 
influential and that the inevitable conflicts will be resolved in ways 
that they dislike. Individuals acting on their own, however, generally 
have no ability to exercise such influence. They cannot protect 
themselves if the legislature, or some other institution to which the 
legislature has delegated rulemaking authority, decides to single them 
out for disadvantageous treatment. Consequently, the Due Process 
Clause provides that when the government takes action that 
disadvantages the individual in some way, it must prove to some 
independent decision-maker that the person belongs to a general 
category on which the disadvantage has been imposed through the 
political process.99  
                                                   
 98. Id. The plaintiff’s claim was that it had not been given a chance to contest 
the validity of the forty percent increase. See id. at 443-44. It would have been entitled 
to a hearing if it raised a claim that involved the application of the increase to its 
individual circumstances––for example, that its property was located outside the 
boundaries of Denver. See id. at 444-45. 
 99. For a challenge to this approach, see EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 93-104. 
See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY (2008). Professor Epstein argues that there 
should be no difference between taking one person’s property and taking many 
people’s. See EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 94. In fact, he says, “the greater the numbers, 
the greater the wrong.” Id. The problem with this argument is that the change in the 
number of people affected is not simply a difference in scale but a different in kind. 
That is black letter constitutional law, having been established in the Londoner and 
Bi-Metallic cases and, as stated above, reflects basic democratic theory. Epstein’s 
argument applies if the Landmarks Commission in Penn Central had prohibited a 
series of specifically identified structures from using their air rights but not for a 
generally applicable law. Epstein continues: “What stamps a government action as a 
taking simpliciter is what it does to the property rights of each individual who is 
subject to its actions.” Id. That view, however, seems to depend on an a priori 
preference for property rights over democratic decision making, a view with neither 
doctrinal nor normative support, and one he never attempts to justify. He also argues 
that giving the government the power to reduce property values by general enactment 
may lead to bad public policy. See EPSTEIN supra note 7, at 263-82. That may be true 
in some cases, such as “spot zoning,” but it is a matter that we necessarily leave to 
democratically elected legislatures. A further argument is that general statutes may in 
fact be masquerades for individualized takings. EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 101 That is 
in fact a problem, but it is the sort of problem that is appropriately referred to courts, 
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The Contracts Clause, one of the Constitution’s Article I, § 10 
restrictions on state governmental action, was almost certainly 
understood in similar terms at the time the original Constitution was 
drafted. It was designed to prohibit state legislatures from passing laws 
denying specified creditors the right to collect on a debt, a tempting 
type of enactment during the post-Revolutionary period in cases where 
the debtor was an influential citizen and the creditor a foreign 
speculator.100 As such, it was also similar to the Bill of Attainder 
Clause, which appears immediately before it in § 10.101 Since the 
adoption of the Fifth Amendment shortly thereafter, it has been 
regarded as an attribute of the due process guarantee and thus 
governed by the same distinction that informs Londoner and Bi-
Metallic.102 Even the Lochner Court understood it in this way, rejecting 
                                                   
which should strike down legislation that purports to be general but in fact is directed 
toward a single individual. 
 100. See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 297-99 (2004); BRAY 
HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL 
WAR 95-103 (1957). As Hammond notes, another way to achieve the same result was 
for these influential citizens to induce the state legislature to issue paper money that 
they could use to pay their debts. See id. at 96. Being general legislation, this practice 
would not have fallen under the prohibition of the Contracts Clause, and thus had to 
be prohibited by a separate provision in § 10 denying states the power “coin money; 
emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver coin a Tender in Payment of 
Debts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 101. See MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
439-40 (1966). According to Madison’s notes for August 28, Rufus King, after the 
Convention had voted 8-1-1 in favor of language that would become § 10, proposed 
to add “a prohibition on the States to interfere in private contracts.” Id. at 439. 
Gouverneur Morris objected: “That would be going too far. There are thousands of 
laws related to bringing actions—limitations of actions & which affect contracts . . . .” 
Id. (emphasis added). After further colloquy, James Wilson responded: “The answer 
to these objections is that retrospective interferences only are to be prohibited.” Id. at 
440 (emphasis added). Madison asked whether that was “already done by the 
prohibition of ex post facto laws.” Id. He then notes: “Mr. [John] Rutlidge moved 
instead of Mr. King’s motion to insert—’nor bills of attainder nor retrospective 
laws.’” Id. His motion carried, 7-3. See id. The Contracts Clause did not appear in the 
subsequent Committee on Style draft that Madison copied, see id. at 597, but––
according to his notes again––it was added on September 14. See id. at 619. 
 102. The result is that the Court has almost invariably rejected challenges to 
legislation based on the Contracts Clause. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 506 (1987); Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kan. Power & 
Light, 459 U.S. 400, 410 (1983); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 
398, 437-38 (1934).  
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a challenge to a state law that prohibited banks from foreclosing on 
mortgages once the law was enacted.103  
Another way to understand the status of property rights under 
the Due Process Clause is to compare the protection afforded to these 
rights with the Clause’s protection of liberty. The Supreme Court 
clearly recognizes that rights best characterized as liberty can be 
created by state law and that such rights receive due process protection 
under the same rationale as state-created property rights.104 But, in 
contrast to property, the Court has also recognized that liberty, unlike 
property, includes intrinsic rights possessed by all human beings and 
more specifically all citizens.105 These include such essential freedoms 
as the right to move freely about, the right to choose one’s place or 
residence, the right to choose one’s intimate partners, and the right to 
give birth to and raise children.106 In other words, liberty, unlike 
property, is not created by state law; it is a basic condition guaranteed 
by the Constitution.  
This means that liberty must be defined by constitutional law. 
As in the case of property, the government may deprive citizens of 
their liberty under certain circumstances as long as it provides them 
with due process, that is, as long as it uses specified procedures to 
show that they belong in a legally defined category that has been 
determined, through the political process, to merit the imposition of a 
disadvantage.107 But the intrinsic quality of liberty means that there are 
                                                   
 103. See generally Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398. This continues to be regarded as 
the leading case. It is typically stated as holding that the Contracts Clause applies only 
to existing contracts and not to future ones, a principle that is sufficient to decide the 
issue in the case. This is essentially equivalent to the singling out formulation, since 
the legislation could hardly single out an individual contract for disadvantageous 
treatment if that contract was not yet in existence. 
 104. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1974) (liberty as well as property 
interests attain “constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been initially 
recognized and protected by state law”). The clearest examples of state-created liberty 
interests are prisoner’s rights cases because they involve rights granted to individuals 
against the background of a justified deprivation of basic liberty. E.g., Greenholtz v. 
Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979) (state created parole 
system with definitive criteria creates a liberty interest); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 
418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (state-created good time credit program creates a liberty 
interest). However, the Court cut back severely on this doctrine in Sandin v. Conner, 
515 U.S. 472, 501 (1995) in favor of an approach to prisoners’ rights that focuses on 
intrinsic or constitutionally defined liberty. 
 105. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 701. 
 106. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2635 (2015) (right to choose 
one’s spouse); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 492 (1999) (right to travel); Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 764 (1982) (right to raise one’s children). 
 107. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 764. 
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also limits, arising from the Constitution itself, on the sorts of legally 
defined categories that the government may create.108 This is the 
doctrine of substantive due process, which holds that the Due Process 
Clause, in addition to providing procedural protection for individuals, 
imposes substantive limits on general legislation through its concept 
of liberty.109 
Substantive due process presents difficulties because the 
constitutional text does not specify the elements contained in the term 
liberty.110 In reaction to the Lochner Era decisions, the Supreme Court 
has tried to combat this uncertainty by using other portions of the text, 
most notably the other Bill of Rights amendments, to give it content.111 
Ultimately, however, the Court has been compelled to recognize that 
the absence of at least certain elements of liberty from the text does 
not indicate an intent to exclude them but simply their lack of salience 
at the time the text was drafted or amended.112  
A further indication of the difference between the Constitution’s 
concept of property as a creation of state law and liberty as an intrinsic 
human right is provided by the final clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
which is of course the basis of the regulatory-takings doctrine.113 It 
                                                   
 108. See id. at 756. 
 109. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966) (right to travel). 
 110. See id. at 764. 
 111. Most notably, with respect to the constitutional right of privacy. In 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Justice Douglas, writing for the Court 
in a decision that struck down a state law prohibiting the distribution of 
contraceptives, began by declining to employ the substantive due process doctrine: 
Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. [New York] . . . 
should be our guide. But we decline that invitation as we did in West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish . . . . We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine 
the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, 
business affairs, or social conditions.  
Id. at 481-82. Instead, Justice Douglas said: “[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give 
them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy.” Id. at 484 
(citation omitted). He then went on to identify the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments as the guarantees that formed this penumbra by their emanations. See 
id. A similar rationale was employed in a number of other decisions that grounded 
reproductive rights on the idea of constitutional privacy in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).  
 112. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (“Indeed, changed understandings of 
marriage are characteristic of a Nation where new dimensions of freedom become 
apparent to new generations, often through perspectives that begin in pleas or protests 
and then are considered in the political sphere and the judicial process.”); see 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (describing the view that liberty 
includes choice of one’s intimate partner as an “emerging awareness”). 
 113. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2633. 
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states: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”114 This is, in effect, an alternative to due 
process.115 Instead of demonstrating that the individual whose property 
is taken is subject to such disadvantageous treatment because she 
belongs within a general, legally established category, the 
government, acting in its executive capacity, can simply take the 
individual’s property for a public purpose.116 Such action, of course, 
creates precisely the danger of oppression that the Due Process Clause 
is designed to prevent. In this case, however, oppression is avoided by 
providing the individual with monetary compensation for the loss of 
property.117 The market thus takes the place of the legislature, setting 
the value of the individual’s property independently of the 
particularized action.118 The individual may not appeal to the courts to 
contest the government’s right to take his property, so long as it meets 
the public use requirement, but may contest the government’s 
particularized assessment about what the property is worth.119 
The availability of this alternative to due process rests on the 
principle that no one in modern society possesses unrestricted or 
“allodial” rights to property.120 All property is subject to government 
                                                   
 114. U.S. CONST. amend. V. As noted above, supra note 86 and accompanying 
text, this was the first provision of the Bill of Rights to be applied to the states. See 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234-35 (1897).  
 115. See id. at 235-36. 
 116. See id. at 229. 
 117. See id. at 229-30. 
 118. See id. at 237-38. 
 119. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1984); 
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, More or Less, 441 U.S. 506, 511-12 (1979); 
Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 50, at 569; Chang, supra note 50, at 71; Dagan, supra 
note 50, at 750; Serkin, supra note 50, at 712. 
 120. Such rights may have existed in Anglo-Saxon England, although this is a 
matter of debate. See, e.g., TOM LAMBERT, LAW AND ORDER IN ANGLO-SAXON 
ENGLAND 296-306 (2017) (kings continued pre-existing private rights to land when 
expanding their territory); see also PAUL VINOGRADOFF, THE GROWTH OF THE MANOR 
212-13 (1905) (property in land existed as a remnant of previous tribal arrangements); 
PATRICK WORMALD, LEGAL CULTURE IN THE EARLY MEDIEVAL WEST: LAW AS TEXT, 
IMAGE AND EXPERIENCE 313-32 (1998) (no private property rights to land existed; all 
land belonged to the king). The general view is that any such allodial rights came to 
an end with the Norman Conquest, when William I declared himself the allodial 
owner of all the land in England. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE 
FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 440 (1983); NORMAN F. CANTOR, 
THE CIVILIZATION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 4 (rev. ed. 1993); R.H.C. DAVIS, A HISTORY 
OF MEDIEVAL EUROPE FROM CONSTANTINE TO ST. LOUIS 284-87 (2d ed. 1988); DAVID 
C. DOUGLAS, WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR: THE NORMAN IMPACT ON ENGLAND 265–316 
(1967). This claim is also open to debate. See SUSAN REYNOLDS, FIEFS AND VASSALS: 
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control and thus to the government’s power of eminent domain as well 
as its power to enact general rules.121 This was the understanding of 
the Takings Clause at the time of its enactment, as the historical 
scholarship of John Hart and William Treanor reveals.122 Because 
liberty is not subject to government control in the same way, there is 
no equivalent to the Takings Clause for liberty interests. The 
government may not incarcerate an individual it dislikes and 
compensate her for her loss of freedom, or compel an individual to 
carry out a particular task on the government’s behalf and pay him the 
value of his labor, or prevent an individual from marrying the person 
of her choice and give her a nice house in compensation.123 Here again, 
                                                   
THE MEDIEVAL EVIDENCE REINTERPRETED 48-53 (rev. ed. 1996) (arguing that even 
so-called allodial rights had always been subject to royal control). 
 121. See Kirby Forest Indus., 467 U.S. at 9-10. 
 122. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern 
Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1256 (1996) (colonial legislatures 
regarded as legitimate laws that restricted the use of land in order to achieve public 
purposes); John F. Hart, Land Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning 
of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1100 (2000) (legislatures in the period 
after independence engaged in extensive regulation of landowners’ use of their 
property); Treanor, supra note 7, at 787 (Framers viewed the Takings Clause as 
protecting against political process failures, specifically seizure of land, slaves, and 
military supplies); see also J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of 
Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 Ecology L.Q. 89, 91-96 (1995) (tracing the 
interpretation of the Taking Clause for the first century after its enactment). The 
argument that regulation of economic interests was neither unknown nor unaccepted 
in the early years of the nation has recently been buttressed by Jerry Mashaw. See 
JERRY MESHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9 (2012).  
 123. This last example was arguably the law in England during the feudal era. 
Because a fief was regarded as a provisional grant of land by the king, given in 
exchange for loyalty and certain specific obligations, it was personal to the grantee. 
See MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 318 (L.A. Manyon, trans., 1961). If the grantee 
died, his widow came into possession. But to allow her to marry whom she wished 
would be to place a person in control of the land who had not necessarily sworn 
allegiance to the king or undertaken the required obligations. See id. Consequently, 
the widow could only remarry with the king’s permission. See id.; F.L. GANSHOF, 
FEUDALISM 143-44 (Philip Grierson trans., 1996); REYNOLDS, supra note 120, at 19 
(questioning whether this rule was ever a reality). In any case, the abolition of this 
restriction, which became practical as general obligations of loyalty to the monarch 
took hold and mercenary armies replaced feudal levies, was provided for in Chapter 
8 of Magna Carta. See HOLT, supra note 85, at 199-202. The significant point here is 
that a restriction which was originally part of the feudal law of property came to be 
perceived as a constraint on liberty, which is of course how we would regard it today. 
The distinction between liberty and property is thus a product of the privatization of 
property law that resulted from the growth of centralized royal administrations. It thus 
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our legal system distinguishes property from liberty and treats 
property rights as the product of government policy, not as intrinsic to 
the person’s status as human being or citizen. 
B. The Economic Due Process Doctrine of the Lochner Court 
Although the conception of property as the product of state law 
is securely established in the Anglo–American system, and although 
it is embodied in the text of the U.S. Constitution, it has not been an 
easy principle for some people to accept. One feature of modern 
government that creates this difficulty is democratic rule. At least 
since Aristotle, the fear has been that the unpropertied masses will vote 
to transfer large amounts of valuable property to themselves or 
undermine the institution of private property in its entirety.124 A 
second, and related, fear is that these masses will elect representatives 
who will impose extensive regulations on property in an effort to 
achieve various policies they favor.125 This fear of administrative 
government, together with the related fear of unshackled democracy, 
became insistent during the Progressive Era.126 Progressivism, a broad-
based social movement,127 was responding to the momentous 
transformations engendered by the growth of industrialism in the 
                                                   
predates the advent of democratic governance, although it was necessarily buttressed 
by that development. 
 124. See THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 193 (Benjamin Jowett, trans., 1952). 
 125. See id. at xxxv. 
 126. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 4 (1955); see generally 
JOHN WHITECLAY CHAMBERS II, THE TYRANNY OF CHANGE: AMERICA IN THE 
PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890–1920 (1992); ERIC F. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH 
DESTINY: A HISTORY OF MODERN AMERICAN REFORM (1952); MICHAEL MCGERR, A 
FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN 
AMERICA (2003); NELL IRVIN PAINTER, STANDING AT ARMAGEDDON: THE UNITED 
STATES, 1877–1919 (1989); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877–1920 
(1967). 
 127. See, e.g., DONATELLA DELLA PORTA & MARIO DIANI, SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION 59 (1999) (discussing the idea of social movements 
generally); WILLIAM A. GAMSON, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL PROTEST 455 (2d ed. 
1990); ALBERTO MELUCCI, NOMADS OF THE PRESENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND 
INDIVIDUAL NEEDS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 168-69 (John Keane & Paul Mier eds., 
1989); SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, COLLECTIVE 
ACTION AND POLITICS 143 (1994); ALAIN TOURAINE, THE VOICE AND THE EYE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 102-03 (Alan Duff, trans., 1981); Anthony 
Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements, 52 SOCIAL FORCES 577, 578 (1974) 
(reviewing LOUIS KRIESBERG, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS (1973)). 
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United States128––the advent of enormous industrial corporations, their 
development of factory-made consumer products, the mass marketing 
of these products to an enthusiastic but unwary public, the expansion 
of the urban working class needed to produce these consumer 
products, the harsh and impecunious conditions to which the workers 
were subjected, and the vast disparities of wealth between the workers 
and the new elite that owned and managed the industrial 
corporations.129 Progressives chose to combat these problems in a 
variety of ways, but a leading strategy, and perhaps the dominant one, 
was to enact state and federal legislation that embodied consciously 
developed social policies.130 Laws to protect workers from injury, 
enable or require them to earn sufficient wages, protect consumers 
from fraudulent or defective products, and improve living conditions 
in the burgeoning cities proliferated rapidly as Progressives gained 
political control.131 This legislation necessarily displaced the existing 
common law rules regarding property with a different and more 
restrictive legal regime.  
In response, a number of Supreme Court Justices at this time 
settled on the idea that Anglo–American law embodied a basic right 
                                                   
 128. See, e.g., SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, AMERICA IN THE GILDED AGE: FROM 
THE DEATH OF LINCOLN TO THE RISE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 6 (3d ed. 1993); see 
also WILLIAM LEACH, LAND OF DESIRE: MERCHANTS, POWER, AND THE RISE OF A NEW 
AMERICAN CULTURE 8 (1993); CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TYCOONS: HOW ANDREW 
CARNEGIE, JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, JAY GOULD, AND J.P. MORGAN INVENTED THE 
AMERICAN SUPERECONOMY 5 (2005); Glenn Porter, Industrialism and the Rise of Big 
Business, in THE GILDED AGE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICA 
11 (Charles W. Calhoun, ed., 2007); W. Bernard Carlson, Technology and America 
as a Consumer Society in 1870–1900, in THE GILDED AGE: ESSAYS ON THE ORIGINS 
OF MODERN AMERICA, supra at 29. 
 129. There were related developments in agriculture. While production 
remained in the hands of individuals––the proverbial family farm––it shifted from 
subsistence farming to the production of cash crops. The marketing and distribution 
functions that necessarily accompanied this shift were controlled by large national 
corporations that paralleled the industrial firms. The Grange was a social movement 
that reacted directly to this situation, while Populism was a more general response to 
both agricultural and urban conditions. See CHAMBERS II, supra note 126, at 2-3; 
LAWRENCE GOODWYN, THE POPULIST MOVEMENT: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE 
AGRARIAN REVOLT IN AMERICA 8 (1978); MCGERR, supra note 126, at 4, 7; ROBERT 
C. MCMATH, JR., AMERICAN POPULISM: A SOCIAL HISTORY 1877-1898 5, 19 (1992); 
ELIZABETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN 
STATE 1877-1917, 14-17 (1999); Worth Robert Miller, Farmers and Third-Party 
Politics, in  THE GILDED AGE: ESSAYS ON THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICA, supra 
note 128, at 283. 
 130. See EDWARD L. RUBIN, SOUL, SELF, & SOCIETY: THE NEW MORALITY & 
THE MODERN STATE 11 (2015). 
 131. See id. at 15-16. 
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to private property and that Progressive legislation, if not properly 
crafted and carefully contained, could violate this right.132 With the 
emblematic decision in Lochner v. New York, they located this right 
in the Due Process Clause’s protection of liberty, which they 
recognized as a term that, unlike property, must be defined by 
constitutional doctrine.133 Anglo–American common law, they 
declared, establishes liberty of contract, the basic right of people to 
negotiate commercial agreements without government interference.134 
This then became the doctrine of substantive due process in the 
economic realm and the instrument that the Court deployed to protect 
private property rights.135  
                                                   
 132. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). 
 133. See id. at 57. 
 134. Liberty of contract was explicitly identified as a property right. See Adair 
v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172 (1908); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 
(1897). 
 135. There is a substantial amount of recent scholarship about the economic 
due process decisions of the Lochner Era. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, 
REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE 
REFORM 23, 127 (2011) (arguing that the decisions were based on natural rights 
element of social contract theory): see also HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION 
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 19 
(1993) (arguing that the decisions were based on skepticism about class legislation 
and a demand for government neutrality); PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: 
ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL 5 (1998); DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF 
CONTRACT: REDISCOVERING A LOST CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 43 (2011) (arguing that 
the decisions were based on defense of liberty); NOGA MORAG-LEVINE, CATCHING THE 
WIND: REGULATING AIR POLLUTION IN THE COMMON LAW STATE 63–85 (2003); Barry 
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson 
of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1399 (2001); Robert C. Post, Lecture, Defending 
the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489, 
1495-96 (1998). A number of these works attempt to rehabilitate these decisions, 
arguing that they were based on important and defensible principles, rather than 
political preferences. As I have suggested elsewhere, however, these arguments fail 
to take account of the Commerce Clause decisions of the same era. E.g., Hammer v. 
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275 (1918) (striking down legislation that prohibited 
interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor); see also United States v. Butler, 
297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936) (striking down legislation that attempted to raise the price of 
agricultural products by inducing farmers to decrease production); Carter v. Carter 
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 316 (1936) (striking down legislation that that set maximum 
hours for coal miners); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935) 
(striking down legislation that established a pension system for railroad employees). 
These decisions rest on federalism grounds and are thus doctrinally unrelated to the 
due process decisions, but they have the same political valence. See Edward L. Rubin, 
Lochner and Property, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS ON 
THEMES IN THE WORK OF JERRY MASHAW 398 (Nicholas Parrillo, ed., 2017). 
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The doctrine may have seemed plausible at the beginning of the 
Progressive Era because common law rules still predominated in 
American law, but it became both conceptually and politically 
indefensible as progressive legislation displaced common law with the 
administrative state. Ultimately, the doctrine was overturned by the 
Court in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish136 and United States v. 
Carolene Products Co.137 In the same session that the Court decided 
Carolene Products, it decided Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,138 which 
declared that in a diversity case, as opposed to a federal question case, 
there is no federal common law to apply. Instead, the federal judge 
must determine what the common law or positive law of the relevant 
state provides.139 The decision thus recognizes that common law is 
merely state law established by legislative delegation to the judiciary 
rather than by legislative enactment.140 By thus demoting common 
law, Erie refuted the underlying principle on which the economic due 
process cases were based, namely, the principle that common law is 
superior to positive law and that common law rights are included in 
the constitutionally defined liberty that the Due Process Clause 
protects.  
                                                   
 136. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937) (upholding 
state minimum wage law for women employees). 
 137. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 144 (1938) 
(upholding prohibition on sale of milk mixed with vegetable oil). For an illuminating 
account of this case, see Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 
1987 SUP. CT. REV. 397, 397 (1987). Like the decisions they overruled, these 
decisions are often explained in purely political terms, as Justice Owen Roberts’ 
“switch in time that saved nine.” Here too, however, there is a revisionist account, in 
this case more convincing. Barry Cushman argues that the 1937–38 decisions were 
principled ones based on a gradually evolving understanding that the Lochner Court’s 
distinctions between justifiable and unjustifiable economic regulation were 
incoherent. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE 
STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 11-65 (1998). 
 138. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).  
 139. See Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Common Law, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 495 (2010). Rejecting the existence of general common law 
does not mean that there is no federal common law, of course. Federal common law 
will exist in any circumstance where the federal courts have been authorized by 
Congress, explicitly or implicitly, to develop rules in an area subject to federal control. 
Such areas include labor law, the law regarding the commercial paper of the United 
States, and administrative law. One of the most famous non-constitutional cases of 
the past half century, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), can 
be regarded as federal common law.  
 140. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964) (state common 
law of defamation is state action subject to First Amendment restrictions); Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18 (1948) (state common law of contracts is state action subject 
to Fourteenth Amendment). 
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The 1937–38 rejection of substantive due process for economic 
interests was definitive. But the belief that common law property 
rights have constitutional status retained its normative appeal despite 
the explicit recognition of its invalidity. Without any clear 
justification, the Court maintained the belief that only rights created 
by common law were entitled to constitutional protection under the 
procedural aspect of the Due Process Clause; rights created by statute, 
it held, could not serve as a basis for constitutional protection.141 This 
distinction, the so-called rights–privileges distinction,142 was grounded 
in the Lochner Era substantive due process doctrine that the Court had 
rejected. While the Court no longer claimed that common law property 
rights were protected by substantive due process, there was never any 
doubt that they continued to be protected by procedural due process; 
that is, those disadvantaged by the government could not challenge the 
law establishing the disadvantage, but could challenge the application 
of that law to their particular situations.143 The Court then committed 
the logical error of concluding that the inverse of this rule was also 
true, namely, if a right was not created by common law, then it was 
not protected by the Due Process Clause. The source of this error was 
the continued belief that common law had some sort of constitutional 
significance; even if it no longer was a source of substantive due 
process protection, it was still a precondition for procedural due 
process protection.  
After two decades of cases that challenged this distinction, and 
a leading law review article by Charles Reich,144 the Court finally 
recognized that the rights–privileges distinction was invalid.145 Any 
                                                   
 141. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960). 
 142. See, e.g., id. at 611 (denying due process protection for termination of 
government benefits); see also Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 452 (1954) 
(denying due process protection for termination of government license); Levine v. 
Farley, 107 F.2d 186, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 622 (1940) 
(denying due process protection for termination of government employment). The 
classic statement is by then-Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes in a state case, McAuliffe 
v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892): “The petitioner may have a 
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman.” 
 143. See Barsky, 347 U.S. at 455. 
 144. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 740, 742 
(1964); Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal 
Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1246 (1965).  
 145. See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In the majority 
opinion, Justice Brennan wrote: “[Welfare] benefits are a matter of statutory 
entitlement for persons qualified to receive them. Their termination involves state 
action that adjudicates important rights. The constitutional challenge cannot be 
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substantial right, no matter what its source, merits due process 
protection. The purpose of the Due Process Clause is to protect 
typically powerless individuals from oppression, and taking away a 
person’s welfare benefits or driver’s license is just as oppressive as 
taking away her bank account or automobile. Thus, having grappled 
with Progressive, New Deal, and Great Society legislation for seven 
decades, the Supreme Court finally recognized the basic status of 
property in the Anglo–American legal system. As Justice Stewart, 
writing for the majority in Board of Regents v. Roth, declared: 
“Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. 
Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing 
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as 
state law . . . .”146 
III. THE GENERAL REGULATORY-TAKINGS CASES 
By the mid-1970s, it appeared that the conceptual confusion 
regarding property rights that had afflicted the Supreme Court since 
the beginning of the century had been resolved.147 The Justices 
understood that property rights are entirely subject to state law in our 
legal system and thus to be determined by the political process, not the 
Constitution.148 They further understood that common law is simply 
one form of state law, so that even if property rights are determined 
by judges through the common law, they remain subject to the political 
process and do not acquire constitutional status.149 Finally, they 
understood that, with respect to property rights, the Due Process 
Clause imposes only procedural requirements on the treatment of 
individuals and that the constitutional protection that attaches to those 
requirements does not extend to the general rules by which property is 
created and structured.150  
But the willingness to accept these conclusions was diminished, 
perhaps by the torrent of regulatory law rivaling that of the Progressive 
and New Deal Eras that emerged during the 1960s and early 1970s in 
areas such as civil rights, environmental protection, and consumer 
                                                   
answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are ‘a ”privilege,” and not a 
“right.” Id. at 262 (emphasis added) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 
627 n.6 (1969)) (emphasis in original). 
 146. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
 147. See id. 
 148. See id. 
 149. See id. at 576-77. 
 150. See id. at 576. 
 The Mistaken Idea of General Regulatory Takings 255 
protection.151 This dramatic development seems to have revived the 
age-old and only recently rejected concern that it would be dangerous 
to leave the rules regarding private property in the hands of a 
democratic populace or to allow that populace to empower regulatory 
agencies to protect its interests. Confronted with laws that seemed to 
impose particularly severe impacts on certain types of property held 
by private individuals, the Court extended regulatory-taking doctrine 
to generally applicable governmental law or regulations.152 As stated 
in the previous Part, this application of the Takings Clause 
requirement depends on the idea that there is a right to private property 
that limits such generally application actions.153  
The fact that there is, in our legal system, no such right has 
rendered these decisions incoherent. This Part shows the way in which 
the leading regulatory-takings decisions suffer from such incoherence 
and how it results from the absence of the right on which the decisions 
claim to rest. It begins with a discussion of Mahon,154 the seminal case, 
                                                   
 151. See generally Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012); 
Truth in Lending Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012); Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 
(2012); Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 
(1972); Clean Air Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-675, 80 Stat. 954 (1966); Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, 
THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
(1985); RANDALL WOODS, PRISONERS OF HOPE: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, THE GREAT 
SOCIETY, AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM (2016); JULIAN E. ZELIZER, THE FIERCE 
URGENCY OF NOW: LYNDON JOHNSON, CONGRESS, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE GREAT 
SOCIETY (2015).  
 152. See Schwartz, supra note 67, at 248 (arguing that the doctrine of 
regulatory takings is not supported by any mode of constitutional interpretation and 
instead rests on a preference for a laissez-faire political economy). The argument here 
is different in that it maintains that only restrictions on general regulatory-takings lack 
constitutional foundation. See id. at 270-71. Restrictions on specific regulatory 
takings, it is argued, are justified by the Due Process Clause and its conjunction with 
the Takings Clause. See id. But the particular way in which the Takings Clause has 
been interpreted in some of the specific regulatory-takings cases in fact seems to suffer 
from some of the interpretive problems that Professor Schwartz identifies. 
 153. See supra Section II.A. 
 154. See generally Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York Court also identifies Mahon as “the 
leading case for the proposition that a state statute that substantially furthers important 
public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount 
to a ‘taking.’” Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 
(1978). General discussions of regulatory takings doctrine typically begin with 
Mahon. See generally FISCHEL, supra note 19; Byrne, supra note 122; Carol M. Rose, 
Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 
561 (1984). 
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and proceeds to the two leading general regulatory-takings decisions 
as identified by Lingle, namely Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp.155 and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,156 then 
discusses the Court’s recent modification of Lucas in Murr v. 
Wisconsin.157 The basic doctrinal defect of general regulatory-takings 
doctrine is described in the preceding Part; this Part shows how that 
defect is reflected in the Court’s leading efforts to deny it. 
A. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 
In Mahon, a mining company had conveyed the surface rights to 
a property it owned but expressly reserved the right to mine coal 
underneath.158 The owner of the surface rights, who had built a 
residence on the land, sought to prevent the company from exercising 
its contractual right to extract the coal on the basis of a state statute 
that forbid mining that would cause the subsidence of a private 
residence above the mine.159 After conceding that “[g]overnment 
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could 
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general 
law,” the Court noted that the effect of the government’s regulation in 
this case was to destroy the entire value of the mine.160 Such regulation 
“goes too far,” it concluded, and thus should be “recognized as a 
taking” for which compensation must be paid.161 
This decision was handed down at the height of the substantive 
due process era, and there is thus nothing particularly surprising about 
its result. The Court was applying its principle that there is a right to 
private property that acts as a constraint on positive law––that is, a 
right that limits the circumstances and extent to which a 
democratically enacted law of general application could reduce the 
value of private property.162 For the most part, it located this right in 
the substantive meaning of the Due Process Clause. Thus, the Court 
                                                   
 155. See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419 (1982).  
 156. See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 157. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1937-39 (2017). 
 158. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412. 
 159. See id. at 412-13. 
 160. Id. at 413, 419. 
 161. Id. at 415. 
 162. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 114 
(1977) (identifying the Mahon decision as substantive due process); see also 
Schwartz, supra note 67, at 248 (stating entire regulatory-takings doctrine is based on 
laissez-faire policy). 
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held in contemporary cases that the state could not, through general 
legislation, limit the price a company charged for theater tickets,163 
prohibit a company from using rags to stuff mattresses,164 or stop a 
company from selling ice unless it obtained a license.165 If the state 
wanted to achieve these results, it was required to treat the reduction 
in value as a taking and compensate the property owners for their 
loss.166 In Mahon, the Court held that the state could not prohibit a 
company from mining in a way that would produce surface subsidence 
unless it treated the reduction in value in this same way.167 
What was surprising about Mahon was that the opinion was 
written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, generally an opponent of 
substantive due process doctrine,168 as well as the author of the Bi-
Metallic decision.169 For this reason, subsequent courts have treated it 
with respect, rather than dismissing it as they do other such decisions 
from the Lochner Era. But the Mahon decision, despite its honored 
authorship, belongs securely in this disfavored category.170  
                                                   
 163. See Tyson & Brother—United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 
273 U.S. 418, 442-43 (1927). 
 164. See Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402, 409, 415 (1926). 
 165. See generally New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
 166. The principle was well established prior to the Lochner Era. See 
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 178 (1872) (discussing inadvertently 
flooding a particular piece of land when building a dam is a taking that requires 
compensation). 
 167. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 168. Most famously in the emblematic Lochner case, where he wrote: “This 
case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not 
entertain . . . . The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s 
Social Statics.” Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905). 
 169. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 443 
(1915). 
 170. Holmes was undoubtedly a great judge, but his decisions do not preclude 
criticism. He shifted his interpretation of the clear and present danger test that he had 
developed in the Court’s first free speech decisions, see Frohwerk v. United States, 
249 U.S. 204, 205-06, 210 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (criticism of American entry into 
World War I is not protected speech); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 47-52 
(1919) (Holmes, J.) (circulation of a leaflet opposing military conscription as a form 
of involuntary servitude is not protected speech), and later conceded that his earlier 
interpretation had been in error. See DAVID RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN 
YEARS 279-97 (1997); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN 
WARTIME: FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 192-211 
(2004); David Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1208-09 (1983). His opinion in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 
(1927), allowing a possibly impaired woman to be sterilized, is now regarded as an 
error and a disgrace. See EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE WEAK: EUGENICS AND 
AMERICA’S CAMPAIGN TO CREATE A MASTER RACE 117-22, 401-02 (expanded ed. 
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Examination of the opinion suggests one possible reason why 
Justice Holmes diverged from his usual position regarding regulation. 
It seems that he was approaching the case as if it involved government 
action directed toward a single piece of property. He began the opinion 
by describing the contract between the coal company and the home 
owner, pointing out that “[t]he deed conveys the surface but in express 
terms reserves the right to remove all the coal under the same and the 
grantee takes the premises with the risk and waives all claim for 
damages that may arise from mining out the coal.”171 He continued: 
“[P]laintiffs say that whatever may have been the Coal Company’s 
rights, they were taken away by an Act of Pennsylvania.”172 All these 
statements are accurate, but the phraseology seems to imply that the 
statute was directed to this specific contract, an impression supported 
by Holmes’ following statement that “the statute is admitted to destroy 
previously existing rights of property and contract.”173  
Holmes concedes that the state was imposing the prohibition on 
the coal company pursuant to a general statute and that many such 
statutes diminish the value of private property.174 But then he wrote: 
“This is the case of a single private house.”175 It was not, of course; the 
case affected the status of every private house in Pennsylvania that 
came within the terms of the statute. Holmes continued: “A source of 
damage to such a house is not a public nuisance even if similar damage 
is inflicted on others in different places. The damage is not common 
or public.”176 The difficulty with this is that many private actions that 
endanger public health affect people one at a time. It is true that a law 
regulating a factory’s release of noxious gas clouds protects against a 
danger that would afflict a mass of people simultaneously, but a law 
regulating a factory’s production of a poisoned medicine protects 
against a danger to each individual consumer at the time she takes the 
pill.  
                                                   
2012); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 1-6 (2014); 
PAUL LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL 157-84 (2008); VICTORIA NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: 
SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS 29-31 (2008). 
 171. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412.  
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 413. 
 174. Id. (“Government could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general 
law.”). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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Perhaps Holmes went off track at this point because he reverted 
to the idea that the government action in question was directed against 
a single individual, stating that the statute “purports to abolish what is 
recognized by Pennsylvania as an estate in land––a very valuable 
estate—and what is declared by the Court below to be a contract 
hitherto binding the plaintiffs.”177 He then continued with a statement 
that sounds like a counterfactual but seems to embody his actual view 
of the case: “If we were called on upon to deal with the plaintiff’s 
position alone we should think it clear that the statute does not disclose 
a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the 
defendant’s constitutionally protected rights.”178 According to archival 
research by Joseph DiMento, Holmes’ original draft of the opinion 
ended with this statement and a “short comment about the usual 
deference due the legislature.”179 He only included his further 
discussion of the statute’s general reach on the urging of Chief Justice 
Taft, and he did so by reluctantly conceding that “the case has been 
treated as one in which the general validity of the act should be 
discussed.”180 It was in this subsequently added discussion that he 
made the famous or notorious statement that “if regulation goes too 
far, it will be recognized as a taking.”181 
The basic problem with Mahon is that it enforces a right that was 
the basis of the economic due process doctrine that the Court has 
subsequently repudiated. Holmes, who generally rejected that 
                                                   
 177. Id. at 414. The phrase “recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land” 
is presumably a reference to common law. Id. Here, again surprisingly for Holmes, is 
the theme that runs through many of the general regulatory-takings cases, which is 
that common law exists independently, as apparently in some higher plane, from the 
other laws established by the state. See infra notes 263-270 and accompanying text, 
Section II.B. 
 178. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414. 
 179. Joseph DiMento, Mining the Archives of Pennsylvania Coal: Heaps of 
Constitutional Mischief, 11 J. LEGAL HIST. 396, 406 (1990). Moreover, the draft stated 
that the case was not one “of streets used by the public or other matters of immediate 
public interest.” Id. 
 180. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414. Professor DiMento concludes that the “[o]pinion 
grew from one perhaps over-hastily drafted and of limited application (to an 
individual private citizen) into one which is a lodestar in the law of regulation of 
property.” DiMento, supra note 179, at 419. 
 181. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. He went on to concede: “It may be doubted how 
far exceptional cases, like the blowing up of a house to stop a conflagration, go—and 
if they go beyond the general rule.” Id. Criticism of this case often focuses on the 
intrinsic vagueness of this formulation. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE 
IN THE LIBERAL STATE 84 (1981); see also Byrne, supra note 122, at 102-06; 
Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 1111-14; Rose, supra note 154, at 566-70; Sax, supra note 
7, at 37. 
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doctrine, was willing to write an opinion that reached the same result 
because he somehow saw the case as involving government action 
against an individual piece of property, and thus depending on the 
genuine right to just compensation. But that view of the facts is 
unsupportable; the decision strikes down a generally applicable statute 
for no other reason than its intrusion upon private property. As such, 
it lacks a legal basis.  
It is this lack of a valid underlying right, rather than the 
vagueness of the “goes too far” formulation, that produces the 
decision’s incoherence and the inability of subsequent cases to make 
sense of it.182 It reifies the adventitious configuration of the property 
in question, a problem that cannot be solved by clarifying or 
elaborating the “goes too far” formulation.183 For the purposes of the 
due process right to liberty, the boundaries of a person are fixed; every 
person has exactly one body, and a deprivation of liberty means an 
action that involves that body and nothing else. Property, however, 
can be increased, decreased, combined, or divided to a virtually 
unlimited extent; the mine might well have extended under 
agricultural land as well, in which case the statute would only have 
eliminated a fraction of its value and would not, according to the 
Court’s own explanation, go “too far.”184 In other words, the implicit 
right to property that the Mahon case creates seems to rely on a naïve, 
almost fetishistic idea that the right in question belongs to the property 
itself rather than its owner, that is, the idea that a particular physical 
object is entitled to constitutional protection. If that were true, it could 
readily have served as the basis for the Court to fashion a “too far” 
jurisprudence; the problem is that it is false.185 
B. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 
Loretto, the first major general regulatory-takings decision after 
Mahon, involved a challenge to a New York State statute that required 
owners of rental property to allow the installation of cable television 
                                                   
 182. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. This can be regarded as a version of the “denominator” problem that 
became apparent after Lucas. See infra Section IV.A. In terms of Mahon’s facts, one 
manifestation of the problem is the possibility that the mine owner could compel the 
government to compensate it for the law’s effect on a mine that did not eliminate the 
total value of the mine by creating two separate legal entities, one of which would 
hold the part of the mine under the residential area while the other held the under the 
part under the farmland. 
 185. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. 
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equipment (cables and junction boxes) on their property.186 Loretto, 
the purchaser of a property in which this equipment had already been 
installed, argued that the statute constituted a taking that required 
compensation by the state.187 In an opinion by Justice Marshall, the 
Supreme Court concluded “that a permanent physical occupation 
authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public 
interests that it may serve.”188  
Given that Loretto was decided in 1982, rather than 1922, the 
result is genuinely surprising.189 A large category of property owners 
in New York State were required by a democratically enacted state 
law to comply with certain regulatory requirements that affected only 
their economic interests and had no impact on their personal liberty.190 
This is a standard type of enactment in an administrative state, one that 
imposes obligations on commercial property for the protection or 
benefit of a public that depends, for many of its necessities and 
amenities, on commercial establishments of various kinds. Loretto 
was not claiming that her particular property was incorrectly subjected 
to the statutory requirement; if she had advanced that claim, she would 
of course have been entitled to due process procedure to resolve it. 
Rather, her claim was that the statute itself constituted a taking of 
property from all the rental buildings that were subject to its 
requirements.191  
The efficiencies and equities of the New York statute can be 
debated; to do so, however, would reiterate the extensive debate about 
takings law in its entirety. None of this should matter in the case of a 
general regulatory enactment like the statute in Loretto because courts 
stopped imposing constitutional limits on the efficiencies and equities 
of such enactments in 1937. Perhaps it was the distinctive facts of the 
Loretto case that were responsible for its anomalous result. First, the 
cable equipment at issue was installed by a private company, rather 
than by the property owner pursuant to regulatory instructions.192 
Second, the equipment, at least initially, did not benefit the residents 
                                                   
 186. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 
(1982). 
 187. See id. 
 188. Id. at 426. The invasion, as described by the Court, consisted of “a direct 
physical attachment of plates, boxes, wires, bolts, and screws to the building, 
completely occupying space immediately above and upon the roof and along the 
building’s exterior wall.” Id. at 438. 
 189. See id. at 419. 
 190. See id. at 421. 
 191. See id. at 424. 
 192. See id. at 421-22. 
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of the owner’s building but served as part of the transmission system 
for other buildings in the vicinity.193 Third, the statutorily authorized 
fee, set by a state agency, was an insulting “one-time $1 payment.”194 
But the dominant factor, the one on which the Court relied and that 
Lingle identified as an exception from the Penn Central test, was the 
characterization of the statute as an “occupation” of the property, a 
“permanent physical invasion” in the words of the Lingle Court.195  
There is, to be sure, a visceral sense, derived perhaps from pre-
administrative common law that the government may not intrude upon 
a person’s property without providing compensation.196 But to 
describe the New York statute as an occupation or invasion elevates 
metaphor over reality. It conjures up the image of state agents 
physically entering a private property and using it for their own 
purposes while the owner huddles in a corner.197 Implicit in this image 
is that the intrusion is directed against a specific property. In fact, the 
New York statute simply added one more restriction, by operation of 
general law, to the wide range of restrictions typically imposed on 
                                                   
 193. See id. at 422. The cable was connected to the units in Loretto’s building 
two years after she purchased the property. See id. 
 194. Id. at 423. 
 195. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. at 537-38. 
 196. See Michelman, supra note 19, at 1226-29. Professor Michelman notes 
that a physical invasion standard involves contradictions because it may compensate 
for nominal harms or harms that are no greater than related ones that are deemed non-
compensable. See id. at 1226. He also questions the principle that “physical use or 
occupation by the public of private property may make it seem rather specially likely 
that the owner is sustaining a distinctly disproportionate share of the cost of some 
social undertaking,” on grounds that it too fails to distinguish between significant and 
insignificant losses. Id. at 1227. These concerns certainly apply in Loretto, where an 
actual loss of value would be difficult to discern, although the loss or opportunity to 
demand additional payment is real enough. Ultimately, Michelman concludes that 
fairness alone cannot justify treating physical invasion as a special case but that 
emotive factors may be relevant, at least from a utilitarian perspective. See id. at 1228. 
The “psychological shock, the emotional protest, the symbolic threat to all property 
and security, may be expected to reach their highest pitch when government is an 
unabashed invader.” Id. Even if we want to take such factors into consideration, 
however, they seem unlikely to apply to a big-city landlord. Beyond the facts of the 
Loretto case, it would seem that a generally applicable regulation would be less likely 
to induce the shock and protest that Michelman describes because it would involve 
interferences with the property that are shared by other similarly situated people. 
 197. In Mahon, Justice Holmes referred to “the blowing up of a house to stop 
a conflagration” Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). That is a total 
taking, of course, but one might picture the fire officers as damaging the house by 
running equipment through it to combat a nearby conflagration. Here again, the image 
fits specific governmental action but not general action.  
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urban rental properties.198 Surely, anyone who owns an apartment 
building in a city is already accustomed to extensive requirements 
regarding habitability, heating, fire safety, and structural integrity and 
to repeated inspections by government officials to determine 
compliance with those various requirements.  
Applied to general rather than specific governmental action, the 
Court’s decision necessarily rests on the idea that the there is 
something about property itself that constrains the government from 
enacting general legislation that restricts its use. As in Mahon, reliance 
on that illusory foundation produces a fatal incoherence in the 
decision, an inability to distinguish property that is protected from 
property that can be reduced in value without requiring compensation. 
The Court, aware of this issue, offered reassurance that its decision “in 
no way alters the analysis governing the State’s power to require 
landlords to comply with building codes and provide utility 
connections, mailboxes, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, and the 
like in the common area of a building.”199 But it failed to explain 
exactly why this was true, other than to say that the challenged statute 
authorized “permanent occupation of the landlord’s property by a third 
party.”200 In fact, the difference between cable equipment and utility 
connections or mail boxes cannot be explained in terms of the impact 
on the owner; in each case, a general regulation compels all owners of 
a particular form of property to dedicate a small portion of their 
property for a designated public purpose.201  
The problem extends beyond regulatory laws that require 
installation of devices in a rental property. How is the law struck down 
                                                   
 198. See Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 1152–54 (observing that the requirements 
in Loretto did not interfere with the owner’s use of the property). Professor Rubinfeld 
treats this lack of interference with the owner’s use as the determinative factor by 
reinterpreting the public use requirement of the Takings Clause. See id. at 1153. Here, 
the lack of interference is simply as an indication of the statute’s general regulatory 
character. 
 199. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440. 
 200. Id. This failure was emphasized by the dissent. Id. at 452–53 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). 
 201. The amount of space that the equipment occupied was minimal, 
consisting of: 
[A] cable slightly less than one-half inch in diameter and of approximately 
30 feet in length along the length of the building about 18 inches above the 
roof top, and directional taps, approximately 4 inches by 4 inches by 4 
inches, on the front and rear of the roof . . . [and] two large silver boxes 
along the roof cables.  
Id. at 422 (majority opinion). None of it interfered with any of the building’s 
functions. See generally id. 
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in Loretto to be distinguished, in any coherent way, from a law that 
requires a factory to install pollution control devices on its 
smokestacks or filters on the pipes that drain wastewater into an 
adjoining river? How is it to be distinguished from the ubiquitous state 
and local ordinances that require restaurants and gas stations to have 
toilet facilities for employees and customers?202 How is it to be 
distinguished from the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) rule 
that requires a flight recorder, or “black box,” to be installed in 
privately owned airplanes?203 It is true that the law at issue in Loretto 
did not give the property owner the opportunity to choose the required 
device from a variety of private suppliers, but it is difficult to see why 
this opportunity should be regarded as a constitutional right. The FAA 
rule includes elaborate requirements regarding the design and 
operation of the flight recorder.204 If the government chose to 
manufacture these devices itself, is it likely that court would declare a 
constitutional right to resist their installation? 
                                                   
 202. See, e.g., CA. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114276(a) (West 2016) (“A 
permanent food facility shall provide clean toilet facilities in good repair for use by 
employees.”); see also id. at § 114276(b)(1) (“A permanent food facility shall provide 
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 203. See FAA Flight Data Recorders and Cockpit Voice Recorders, 14 C.F.R. 
§ 91.609 (2010). This provides a good analogy to one of the features of the New York 
statute that may have troubled the Court, namely, the fact that the cable Loretto was 
required to install did not benefit her own tenants, at least at the time of installation. 
See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 422–24. This is also true of the black box with respect to the 
airplane on which it is installed; its main purpose is to provide a benefit to the public 
after the airplane has been destroyed and all the passengers are dead. 
 204. See Federal Aviation Administration, 14 C.F.R. §§ 23.1457, 25.1457, 
27.1457, 29.1457. These rules are in turn supplemented by Technical Standing 
Orders. 
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C. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 
Lucas, the second exception to the Penn Central rule recognized 
in Lingle,205 is a more direct descendent of the Mahon decision. 
Pursuant to the federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, as 
amended in 1980, which directed states to restrict development in 
coastal areas,206 South Carolina passed the Beachfront Management 
Act.207 The Act authorized a state agency to establish a boundary 
beyond which no improvements that could be occupied would be 
allowed.208 Lucas, a developer, had purchased two parcels with the 
intent of building single-family residences.209 Once the agency 
established the required boundary, however, Lucas’ parcels fell on the 
seaward side of the boundary, which meant that residential 
development was forbidden.210 Lucas brought suit claiming that the 
state’s action constituted a taking that required compensation, and the 
Supreme Court agreed.211 Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court 
declared: “[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon to 
sacrifice all the economically beneficial uses in the name of the 
common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has 
suffered a taking.”212 
Like Mahon itself, and like Loretto, the Lucas decision applies 
the Takings Clause to a generally applicable positive law, as Justice 
Stevens pointed out in dissent.213 While the explicit basis for the 
Court’s ruling in Lucas is that it protects individuals who own property 
from regulations that are tantamount to takings, the decision in fact 
protects the property itself from complete destruction of its value. This 
makes sense, once again, only if there is some sort of constitutional 
right to private property.214 The fact that no such right exists renders 
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879-80 (1990)). Justice Scalia’s response in the majority opinion merits full quotation: 
The equivalent of a law of general application that inhibits the practice of 
religion without being aimed at religion . . . is a law that destroys the value 
266 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
the decision incoherent. There is simply no way to make sense of it, 
either in terms of the impact of the government’s action on the owner 
or in terms of the way that property rules operate in our society. 
In terms of the impact on the owner, the Court might have held 
that a generally applicable regulation constitutes a taking if it 
decreases an individual’s wealth by a certain amount of money or by 
a certain proportion. Such rules are not inconceivable, but they do not 
exist in our legal system. The familiar counter-example to regulatory-
takings claims, down-zoning, is applicable here. If a property is 
originally zoned for commercial use, its market value, based on a 
realistic possibility that the property owner could have built a 
shopping center on it, might be $50,000,000. Down-zoned to 
residential use only, the property’s market value might decrease to 
$500,000. The owner, according to law before and after the Lucas 
decision, could not have received compensation for its $49,500,000 
loss.215 But, according to Lucas, if the state then prohibited residential 
                                                   
of land without being aimed at land. Perhaps such a law—the generally 
applicable criminal prohibition on the manufacturing of alcoholic beverages 
challenged in [Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)] comes to mind—
cannot constitute a compensable taking . . . . But a regulation specifically 
directed to land use no more acquires immunity by plundering landowners 
generally than does a law specifically directed at religious practice acquire 
immunity by prohibiting all religions.  
Id. at 1027 n.14 (majority opinion) (emphasis in original). To begin with, Justice 
Scalia fails to explain the basis on which he finds Mugler acceptable. His description 
states that the law in question was generally applicable and criminal, but the 
Beachfront Management Act was generally applicable as well, and there seems no 
reason why a criminal law should be treated differently other than the fact that it is 
likely to be general. Id. On the question of inhibiting the practice of religion, Justice 
Stevens was making an a fortiori argument, that is, a generally applicable law might 
be valid even if it restricts a constitutional right. Id. at 1072 n.7 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). The implicit point, which could certainly have been more clearly stated, 
is that a generally applicable law is valid if there is no constitutional right that its 
restrictions affect. In responding, Justice Scalia treated this argument as if the problem 
of specificity involved the subject matter of the law, not its impact on individuals. 
That is true for religion because there is a constitutional right to practice one’s religion 
free of state interference, a point for which no argument is needed. In claiming that 
the same is true for land use, he simply assumes that there is a similar right to hold 
private property without state interference. But he provides no argument in support of 
this position. 
 215. See generally Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 
(1926) (holding that zoning restrictions are a valid exercise of the police power and 
do not constitute a taking). For a defense of this decision, see generally Carol M. Rose, 
Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings Jurisprudence—An 
Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577 (1990). Professor Epstein argues that 
zoning laws constitute a taking unless they abate a nuisance or constitute a sort of 
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use and the market value dropped to zero, the state would need to 
compensate the owner for the loss of the remaining $500,000 in 
market value. This would be true, moreover, whether the owner was 
an individual of modest means with only this one property, a wealthy 
individual with five other parcels, or a land development corporation 
for which the $500,000 was an insignificant loss. In other words, the 
constitutional status of the owner’s loss is not being determined 
according to any criterion related to the owner but rather one related 
to the piece of property itself. It seems to be the property itself that 
possesses a right not to have its value reduced to zero.216 
Justice Scalia was apparently aware that the source of such a 
right could not be found in any constitutional provision. He conceded, 
as Justice Holmes had in Mahon, that government regulation can 
reduce the economic value of property to zero without triggering the 
compensation requirement if the regulation is justified by sufficient 
public interest or necessity.217 This principle was well-recognized 
throughout the Lochner Era. In Miller v. Schoene, for example, the 
state was allowed to order the destruction of red cedar trees without 
compensation because the trees were infected with a parasite that 
might otherwise become an epidemic.218 The Lucas Court, in dealing 
with this settled principle, rejected the traditional (and Lochner Era) 
formulation that the state would not be required to compensate only if 
the conditions that it sought to remedy were “akin to public 
                                                   
carefully tailored users fee. See EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 130-45. His position 
depends, however, on his claim that there is no difference between specific and 
general government action. 
 216. A variation suggested by the facts of several regulatory-takings cases, 
although not resolved by them, involves the issue of exceptions to a generally 
applicable statute. For example, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 611 
(2001), the owner applied for permission to develop its property in a manner that was 
arguably prohibited by a general land use regulation adopted by the enforcing agency. 
The issue readily lends itself to due process analysis. If the agency had discretion to 
deny the request, there is no right to a hearing and thus no issue. See Olim v. 
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1983) (since prison authorities have full 
discretion to transfer prisoners between institutions, no hearing is required); Bd. of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972) (since a university had full discretion to 
terminate the employment of a probationary employee, no hearing is required). If the 
agency’s discretion was constrained by stated rules, then the applicant is entitled to a 
hearing on whether those rules would support its request. In a case like Palazzolo, that 
would mean a hearing on whether the agency was required to grant the request as an 
exception to the land use statute. If the agency was so required it could still prevent 
the owner from developing its land, but in that case it would need to compensate the 
owner.  
 217. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
 218. See generally Miller v. Schoene 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
268 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
nuisances.”219 This doctrine of harmful or noxious use was, in the 
Court’s view, no longer valid because it failed to comport with the 
“reality we nowadays acknowledge explicitly with respect to the full 
scope of the state’s police power.”220  
Having rejected this formulation, Justice Scalia was then 
required to articulate its replacement. He declared: “Where the State 
seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically 
beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the 
logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate 
shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to 
begin with.”221 But that much goes without saying; if there was 
positive law––that is, a statute or regulation––that proscribed the use 
before the owner bought the property, the matter would be free from 
doubt. Purchasers of land on the seaward side of the South Carolina 
boundary could hardly argue that they are entitled to compensation for 
their inability to carry out legally forbidden construction. But in the 
absence of such a law, Justice Scalia asked, what power did the state 
have to prevent construction?222 He attempted to answer this question 
at the end of the opinion when he stated the principles for deciding 
Lucas’ claim upon remand: “[T]o win its case . . . as it would be 
required to do if it sought to restrain Lucas in a common-law action 
for public nuisance, South Carolina must identify background 
principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses” that the 
property owner intends.223 
This formulation can only escape the reliance on the public 
nuisance doctrine that Justice Scalia abjured if it does precisely what 
the Lochner Court did in its economic process cases, that is, 
constitutionalize common law. The opinion cushions, or perhaps 
obscures, this result by treating common law as the basis of people’s 
reasonable expectations.224 This formulation suffers from several fairly 
                                                   
 219. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022. 
 220. Id. at 1023. 
 221. Id. at 1027. 
 222. See id. at 1031. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See id. at 1027. The Court said, in explaining its test:  
This accords, we think, with our “takings” jurisprudence, which has 
traditionally been guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding 
the content of, and the State’s power over, the “bundle of rights” that they 
acquire when they obtain title to property. It seems to us that the property 
owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time 
to time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate 
exercise of its police powers . . . .  
 The Mistaken Idea of General Regulatory Takings 269 
obvious practical difficulties. The first, as Justice Kennedy pointed out 
in his concurrence, is its “inherent tendency towards circularity,” since 
people’s expectations will be shaped by judicial doctrine.225 Second, 
the Supreme Court has no reliable mechanism for assessing what 
people’s actual expectations may be, so any assertion about these 
expectations becomes a restatement of the Justices’ own views in 
social science clothing.226  
The real problem with the Court’s formulation, however, is that 
it does not actually avoid the Lochner Era’s use of the “legitimate state 
interests” standard to police economic regulation. That standard was 
based on the underlying idea that common law rules, and particularly 
the rules regarding property, possess constitutional significance, so 
that the government cannot change them without some special 
showing. Justice Scalia’s language avoids the Lochner standard but 
continues to rely on its underlying idea. The real problem, as discussed 
above, is that this idea is foreign to our legal system; common law 
                                                   
Id. 
 225. Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The point well exemplified by the 
facts of Lucas. When the plaintiff bought his two parcels of beachfront property in 
1986, the federal Coastal Zone Management Act had been in place for fourteen years, 
and the amendments that triggered the South Carolina law had been in place for six. 
See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Moreover, no one 
in our society could be unaware that the preservation or development of coastal land 
was a matter of intense political controversy which might lead to regulatory 
restrictions on development. 
 226. This argument does not necessarily apply to specific regulatory takings 
for two reasons. First, there is a higher level of uncertainty in such cases. People know, 
or should know, that all property is subject to regulation and that they must factor that 
possibility into their investment decisions. But specific takings depend upon the 
further possibility that the government will demand their particular piece of property. 
This is a much rarer occurrence and is not necessarily something the people should be 
expected to consider in advance. Second, people have recourse against the enactment 
of a general regulation, namely the political process. They have no recourse against a 
specific taking, whether direct or regulatory. In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 
606, 626-30 (2001), which was probably a specific regulatory-takings case, the Court 
held that acquisition of land after a land use regulation had been enacted does not 
prevent the acquirer from challenging a restriction based upon the regulation. This 
seems correct according to this Article’s analysis; the action to which the owner could 
not object, namely the regulation, had already occurred, but the action to which the 
landowner could object, that is, a restriction on its particular parcel, had not. If the 
state had already imposed the particular restriction, however, the acquirer would have 
been bound by it, as the Court recognized. See id. at 628 (when there is a direct 
condemnation of a property, “the fact and extent of the taking are known . . . [and] it 
is a general rule of the law of eminent domain that any award goes to the owner at the 
time of the taking, and that the right to compensation is not passed to a subsequent 
purchaser.”).  
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itself recognizes that positive law, the law enacted by the government, 
prevails over any judge-made doctrine or “background principles.”227 
As stated, the Lochner Era’s constitutionalization of common law 
might have seemed plausible in the pre-administrative era when the 
country had a predominantly common law legal system on which 
positive law episodically intruded. But it became both conceptually 
and politically indefensible with the advent of the administrative state. 
The law at issue in Lucas, like the ones at issue in Loretto and Mahon, 
is nothing more than typical regulatory enactment, in this case one that 
protects the environment rather than tenants or homeowners.228 
Despite the fact that it places restrictions on land, the focus of pre-
modern property law, it should be controlled only by the political 
process, not by the judiciary. Judicial supervision of state law depends 
on the existence of a legal right, and there is no right on which the 
judiciary can rely.229  
Here again, the absence of a recognizable right to support the 
Court’s decision leads to incoherence. As in Mahon and Loretto, there 
is no way to distinguish the type of property right that is being from 
the larger group of property rights that are subject to regulation by 
positive law. In Lucas, this difficulty is the well-known denominator 
problem.230 The only reason the plaintiff lost all the value, or at least 
all the development value, of its property was that the lot in question 
was located entirely on the seaward side of the legislatively defined 
boundary. Had the exact same piece of property been part of a larger 
lot that extended onto the landward side, the loss of value would only 
have been partial. Had that larger lot been large enough, the loss might 
                                                   
 227. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 77, at 167-81; supra notes 75-77 and 
accompanying text. 
 228. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992). 
 229. See Byrne, supra note 122, at 117-23 (regulatory takings decisions are an 
effort to reverse environmental laws). An alternative but related interpretation is that 
the general regulatory taking cases emerge from the Court’s hostility toward 
redistributive legislation. See Rose, supra note 215, at 582-95. Regulatory legislation 
is not necessarily redistributive; the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 
(2012) creates property rights and thereby enriches those it regulates. Conversely, 
redistributive legislation, like a progressive income tax, is not necessarily regulatory. 
But there is a substantial overlap and, from a political perspective, opponents of one 
are often opponents of the other. 
 230. See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 162–67; Fee, supra note 7, at 1029-33; Marc 
R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 663, 
694-707 (1996); Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: Toward A 
Dynamic Theory of Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis, 34 
ENVTL. L. 175, 190 (2004). See generally John E. Fee, Unearthing the Denominator 
in Regulatory Takings Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535 (1994). 
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have represented a minimal reduction of the overall value.231 The 
problem has been widely noted; the point here is that it could be 
readily resolved if there were some body of doctrine that could 
determine when a piece of property merited protection against a 
reduction in value. But there is no such right, and thus there can be no 
such doctrine. 
D. Murr v. Wisconsin 
The Court’s opinion in Murr is an effort to resolve the 
widespread confusion that followed from Lucas. As stated, however, 
this confusion, because it results from the absence of a legal right that 
would support the decision, cannot be resolved, and Murr does not 
resolve it. The case, like Lucas, was a claim that an environmental 
protection statute restricting development on property that fell within 
a given area, in this case a river valley, constituted a taking of one 
particular property that was subject to the general restriction.232 Two 
lots along the river had been purchased separately and transferred at 
different times to a single owner.233 A recreational cabin had been built 
on one of the two lots, and the second lot was unimproved.234 
According to the statute and its implementing regulations, the two lots, 
due to their common ownership, constituted a single property.235 This 
meant, again according to the statute and regulations, that only one 
structure could be built on the combined property and that the property 
could only be sold as a single unit.236 The owners claimed that this 
eliminated the entire value of the unimproved lot and thus required 
compensation.237 
Assuming that Lucas is good law, the crucial issue in the case is 
the denominator problem: whether the property is regarded as one lot 
or two. If viewed as two lots, the value of the second lot was in fact 
entirely eliminated; if viewed as one lot, the limitations on 
                                                   
 231. In fact, a perfectly plausible scenario is that its value would not have been 
reduced at all. Lucas’s loss of his right to develop the seaward part of the property 
might have been counterbalanced by the increase in the value of the landward part, 
which would then be guaranteed a clear view of the sea. A property seller’s ability to 
assure potential buyers that the property’s scenic view is legally protected has real 
economic value. 
 232. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1939-40 (2017). 
 233. See id. at 1940. 
 234. See id. 
 235. See id. at 1941. 
 236. See id. 
 237. See id. 
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construction and subdivision are standard zoning regulations that have 
been repeatedly upheld. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court 
stated that reviewing courts should attempt to determine “whether 
reasonable expectations about property ownership would lead a 
landowner to anticipate that his holdings would be treated as one 
parcel, or, instead, as separate tracts.”238 This inquiry, he continued, 
“is objective, and the reasonable expectations at issue derive from the 
background customs and the whole of our legal tradition.” 239 
Kennedy then proceeded to identify three considerations that 
courts should use in pursuing this purportedly objective inquiry. First, 
they “should give substantial weight to the treatment of the land, in 
particular how it is bounded or divided, under state and local law.”240 
Next, they “must look to the physical characteristics of the 
landowner’s property,” including the “surrounding human and 
ecological environment.”241 “Third, courts should assess the value of 
the property under the challenged regulation, with special attention to 
the effect of burdened land on the value of other holdings.”242 After 
all, he pointed out, the regulation may add “value to the remaining 
property, such as by increasing privacy, expanding recreational space, 
or preserving the surrounding natural beauty.”243 Applying these three 
criteria, the Court concluded that the regulation was not a taking and 
thus no compensation was required.244 Despite this apparently 
systematic and “objective” analysis, the opinion contains a sort of 
leitmotif that regulatory-takings doctrine is irremediably vague and 
uncertain; that it is “ad hoc,” flexible, and non-formalistic;245 that it 
“cannot be solved by any simple test;”246 and that it must rely on the 
experience and care of state and federal judges.247  
                                                   
 238. Id. at 1945. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 1946. 
 243. Id.  
 244. See id. at 1950. 
 245. Id. at 1942 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002)) (“This area of law has been characterized 
by ‘ad hoc factual inquires.’”); id. at 1943 (“A central dynamic of the Court’s 
regulatory jurisprudence, then, is its flexibility.”); see id. at 1946 (both parties “ask 
this Court to adopt a formalistic rule” that fails “to capture the central legal and factual 
principles” governing this area of law).  
 246. Id. at 1950. 
 247. See id. at 1946. 
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Justice Kennedy’s effort to turn the judicial vice of vagueness 
and uncertainty into a virtue may not be laudable, but it is 
understandable.248 In the absence of any legal right on which the 
regulatory-takings doctrine can be grounded when applied to 
generally applicable governmental action, no clear test can be 
formulated to determine when the doctrine applies and when it does 
not. Justice Kennedy’s second consideration––the physical 
characteristics of the property, such as its environmental value––will 
determine whether the state must compensate when it reduces the 
value of property through specific regulatory action, as in Penn 
Central.249 It is irrelevant, and a reversion to substantive due process 
doctrine, in a case of general regulatory action, as the Court held in 
Lingle.250 Kennedy’s third consideration goes to the amount of 
compensation that the government should pay, not to the right to 
obtain such compensation. In a case where the owner is alleging that 
the government reduced the value of the property through regulation, 
rather than having transferred title to some portion of it, the fact that 
the burden on one portion of the property increased the value of the 
property as a whole would mean that there is simply no loss to be 
compensated.251 Thus, the real issue seems to be the first consideration, 
                                                   
 248. See id. at 1954. In fact, the Court, which divided five to three on the 
merits, was unanimous regarding the doctrine’s vagueness and uncertainty. Chief 
Justice Roberts’ dissent, while criticizing the majority opinion for unnecessarily 
complicating the issue, states that “[f]or the vast array of regulations . . . a flexible 
approach is more fitting,” and that Penn Central’s “parcel as a whole” language” is 
“enigmatic.” Id. at 1952 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 249. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 107 
(1978). 
 250. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540-42 (2005); supra 
notes 50-64 and accompanying text. Of course, the restriction that the land must be 
taken for a public use would still apply. 
 251. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1949. The Court noted that the combined lots 
were valued by an appraiser at $698,300, considerably more than the sum of the 
separate value of the lot with the cabin, valued by the county at $373,000, and the 
unimproved lot, valued by the owner’s appraiser at $40,000. Id. “The value added by 
the lots’ combination,” the Court said, “shows their complementarity and supports 
their treatment as one parcel.” Id. What this computation actually shows, however, is 
that it does not make sense to reify a particular piece of property and determine the 
validity of a general law or regulation by whether its effect is to reduce that value of 
that particular piece to zero. The boundaries of property, particularly land, are 
malleable, and their value depends on the way they are combined or separated, 
something that is often within the power of the property owner. This issue would not 
arise in a case where the Takings Clause was truly applicable because the government 
had taken action against a specific piece of property. If the government takes title to 
one tenth of a person’s land to build a road, there is no question that a taking has 
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which is the legal status of the owner’s property. This is precisely what 
Chief Justice Roberts argued in his dissent. The majority “goes 
astray,” he wrote, “in concluding that the definition of ‘private 
property’ at issue in a case such as this turns on an elaborate test 
looking not only to state and local law,” but also to the Court’s other 
considerations.252 The way the case should be decided, he stated, is to 
“stick with our traditional approach[.] State law defines the boundaries 
of distinct parcels of land, and those boundaries should determine the 
‘private property’ at issue in regulatory takings cases.”253 
The majority and dissent are correct in identifying state law as 
the crucial issue, and the dissent is correct in arguing it should be the 
determinative one. But both opinions misunderstand the nature of state 
law. The general rules of property certainly count as state law, but so 
do any generally applicable statutes or regulations that redefine or alter 
those general rules. The restriction on coal mining in Mahon,254 the 
requirement imposed on rental property in Loretto,255 and the 
development limits in Lucas and Murr were all validly enacted 
provisions that are entitled to as much deference from a constitutional 
court as any common law decision.256  
When the majority identifies “the treatment of the land, in 
particular how it is bounded or divided, under state and local law” as 
its first consideration, however, it is clearly referring to the common 
law of property.257 When the dissent says that “[s]tate law defines the 
boundaries of distinct parcels of land and those boundaries should 
determine the ‘private property’ at issue in regulatory takings 
cases,”258 it is referring to common law as well. But neither the 
majority nor the dissent makes this obvious identification. The reason 
                                                   
occurred. The road might increase the value of the remaining nine-tenths by making 
it more accessible, and that increase in value might be greater if the owner combined 
the remaining land with another lot. This increase might mean that the owner 
sustained no economic damage, and was thus not entitled to compensation, but it 
would not alter the conclusion that a taking had occurred.  
 252. Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts listed four 
considerations that were extraneous in his view––the two numbered considerations 
that the majority opinion specified, plus its reliance on reasonable expectations and 
on background customs. See id.  
 253. Id. 
 254. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412 (1922). 
 255. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436-
39 (1982). 
 256. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1007-08 (1992). 
 257. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945. 
 258. Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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is that doing so invalidates the entire doctrine of general regulatory 
takings. Common law is undoubtedly state law, but it does not prevail 
over other laws; it has no superior status. If a statute, or a regulation 
enacted under statutory authority, alters a common law rule, then that 
altered rule, and not the original common law rule, becomes the law 
of the enacting jurisdiction. It is that law which “defines the 
boundaries of distinct parcels of land,” and determines the rights that 
the landowner possesses. In an administrative state, regulatory laws of 
this sort, and not common law, will be increasingly determinative of 
people’s property rights. 
The irony of the Murr decision is that the two dissents, while 
seemingly supportive of the property owner’s claim, in fact represent 
a repudiation of the entire regulatory-takings doctrine when applied to 
general governmental action. The majority opinion, apparently 
concerned about the possibility that Lucas would place excessive 
limits on beneficial legislation, particularly in the environmental area, 
seeks to limit that decision’s reach by adding considerations beyond 
“state law” that reviewing courts should take into account.259 Chief 
Justice Roberts’ dissent, however, declares that the scope of property 
rights should be exclusively determined by state law.260 Because he 
apparently assumed that only common law was state law, he thought 
he was thus endorsing a more stringent limit on regulatory law. But 
since regulatory law is state law as well, he was in fact rejecting the 
entire idea that the Due Process and Takings Clauses place any limits 
on state law, as opposed to the application of that law to individuals. 
Justice Thomas, in a separate dissent, wrote that “it would be desirable 
for us to take a fresh look at our regulatory takings jurisprudence to 
see whether it can be grounded on the original public meaning on the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”261 
The result of such a fresh look would be the same: repudiation 
of the doctrine that those Amendments place any limits on general 
state legislation regarding private property.262  
                                                   
 259. See id.  
 260. See id. 
 261. Id. at 1957 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 262. Justice Thomas seems to have the opposite result in mind, since he 
follows his call for a fresh look at the original text by citing Michael B. Rappaport, 
Originalism and Regulatory Takings: Why the Fifth Amendment May Not Protect 
Against Regulatory Takings, but the Fourteenth Amendment May, 45 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 729 (2008). As the title suggests, Professor Rappaport concedes that the original 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause was limited to physical takings. 
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IV. NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
The importance of private property for a modern economy and 
for modern people’s sense of security and well-being is widely 
recognized; some observers make even stronger claims.263 But the 
scope of these rights has been consigned to the political process in our 
                                                   
See id. at 734-37. Relying on the argument in AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998), that the original Bill of Rights was primarily 
concerned with structural issues, while the Fourteenth Amendment was directed 
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at the very least, by the fact that it was not enacted. In any case, the only point that 
Rappaport’s article claims to make, and could possibly make, is that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was intended to reach some regulations that reduced the value of 
property, not that it included regulations that were generally applicable. See generally 
Rappaport, supra. 
 263. See THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 124, at 458-59 (evaluating 
the practical value of private property); MEIR DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS: 
ESSAYS ON LAW, SELF, AND MORALITY 264-301 (2002) (discussing private property 
and people’s sense and image of themselves); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, To Be Human: 
A Psychological Perspective on Property Law 83 TUL. L. REV. 609, 610 (2009) 
(stating that property determines what it means to be human); Carol M. Rose, 
Introduction: Property and Language, or, the Ghost of the Fifth Panel, 18 YALE J.L. 
& HUMAN. 1, 3 (2006) (suggesting that property is a social as well as an economic 
institution). See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 
(1981) (explaining the relationship between property ownership, public conceptions 
about law, and the sense of freedom); LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF 
PROPERTY (2009) (stating that claims to property rights are based on core values); 
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) 
(explaining that control of property is part of an individual’s sense of self); Joseph 
William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287 (2014) 
(stating that property shapes the social relations that are crucial in establishing a 
democratic polity).  
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system of law. General regulatory-takings doctrine relies on legal 
principles that we have rejected for reasons that are currently well-
recognized and accepted. As a result, it does not serve any purpose 
that has normative validity in our system. It does not protect property 
itself because, as the Supreme Court’s general regulatory-takings 
cases show, there is no coherent distinction between the type of 
property they attempt to protect and the types of property that virtually 
no one wants to protect and could not conceivably be protected 
without destroying modern government. In addition, the doctrine and 
its underlying right to property do not protect any group of people that 
we would regard as meriting protection. This final Part will consider 
these two points in turn. Its conclusion is that reversal of the general 
regulatory-takings cases would be normatively desirable as well as 
doctrinally correct. 
A. Protection of Property 
The preceding Part has described the inability of general 
regulatory-takings cases to explain why some reductions in value are 
regarded as takings as others are not.264 Why was the governmentally 
required installation of cable wires in Loretto deemed a taking but the 
required installation of smoke detectors and mailboxes in the same 
building treated as a valid regulation? Why were the restrictions on 
the land in Lucas treated differently from the way the same restrictions 
on another piece of land would have been treated if that land were a 
portion of a larger parcel? These unexplained and incoherent 
variations, it was argued, indicate the absence of an underlying right 
to property that would support the results in the cases. Here, the point 
will be generalized to explain why such an underlying right is 
normatively undesirable.  
At the beginning of his wide-ranging study of regulatory takings, 
William Fischel derides the claim that “mere regulation,” as opposed 
to a transfer of title, is exempt from the requirement that government 
compensate property owners for the economic losses that the 
regulation imposes.265 He writes: “Everything the law student has been 
taught . . . indicates that legal ‘property’ is not a clod of earth but a 
bundle of legal entitlements . . . . How can the government get away 
without paying for the many restrictions that it unilaterally 
                                                   
 264. See supra Part III. 
 265. FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 2. 
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imposes?”266 The distinction between transfers of title and general 
regulatory laws, however, does not depend on the idea that they 
involve different types of property, but rather that they involve 
different types of government action. When the government transfers 
title to land, it is typically taking action against a specific individual, 
and compensation is required because individuals typically do not 
have recourse to the political process. But when the government takes 
action by “mere regulation,” it may well be acting through generally 
applicable laws which affect groups of people.267 In that case, we rely 
on the political process to determine which groups are advantaged and 
which groups are disadvantaged. 
Fischel’s observation about the nature of property is correct, but 
it argues in favor of the distinction between title transfer and 
regulation that he wants to refute. Virtually all regulatory-takings 
cases involve a “clod of earth,” that is, real property.268 This is 
probably because the power of eminent domain, the power to take title 
to a specific piece of property, is typically needed and satisfies the 
public use requirement, where real property is involved. The first 
regulatory-takings case, Mahon, involved land (underground land, to 
be sure) and is based upon a superficially appealing analogy: If the 
government must pay when it takes a person’s land by eminent 
domain, why should it not pay when it reduces the value of a person’s 
land to zero through a regulation? It was perhaps the force of this 
analogy that led Justice Holmes to overlook the fact that the regulation 
operated generally and to treat it instead as affecting “a single private 
house.”269 Subsequent regulatory takings cases have also involved real 
property, whether they are specific actions, as in Penn Central, or 
general actions as in Loretto, Lucas, and Murr.270  
                                                   
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
 270. The Supreme Court recently decided a general regulatory-takings case, 
Horne v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) that involved chattels, not land, 
but the circumstances were unusual. See id. at 2424. Regulations adopted under the 
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937 require raisin processors to set aside, or “reserve,” 
a specified portion of raisins they are processing, calculated as a percentage of each 
producer’s total crop. See generally Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 
50 Stat. 246 (1937). These reserved raisins may not be sold by the processors on the 
open market; instead, their disposition is determined by a committee established by 
the Department of Agriculture. See generally id. The committee is authorized to 
dispose of the raisins in ways that do not compete with the domestic market; typically, 
it sells them overseas or gives them away to school lunch programs. See generally id. 
If there are proceeds, they are distributed, after deduction of the Raisin Committee’s 
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As Fischel points out however, there is no principled distinction 
between real property and other forms of property; the bundle of legal 
entitlements can attach to a wide range of tangible and intangible 
entities as well as to a “clod of earth.”271 But recognizing a right to 
property for entities other than land, and thus requiring compensation 
when the government reduces their value by general legislation, is 
inconceivable in our system of government. Suppose the government 
decides to prohibit the possession or sale of a previously legal 
substance such as alcohol, heroin, or Ecstasy. Prior to the prohibition, 
people’s inventory of these substances was private property; its 
possession was protected by criminal laws against theft and its sale 
was facilitated by the civil law of contract. After the prohibition, the 
value of the inventory has been reduced to zero. Must the government 
compensate the owners for this loss of value resulting from the general 
prohibition of the substance?272 If the government reduces the length 
                                                   
administrative costs, to the producers on a pro rata basis. See generally id. at 172. The 
Hornes’ raisin processors who refused to set aside any reserve raisins, as required by 
the regulation, argued that the reserve requirement is an uncompensated taking and 
thus unconstitutional. See Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2422. In an opinion by Chief Justice 
Roberts, the Court agreed, holding that the “reserve requirement imposed by the 
Raisin Committee is a clear physical taking. Actual raisins are transferred from the 
growers to the Government.” Id.  
The problem is that no one questions the constitutionality of general legislation 
that stabilizes prices by restricting the quantity of crops that farms may produce. From 
the processors’ perspective, a regulation that forbids them from selling their excess 
raisins is equivalent to a regulation that prevents them from growing those raisins in 
the first place. What makes the regulation in the case different from a regulation 
limiting production, according to the Court, is that the government is taking “[a]ctual 
raisins.” Id. at 2422, 2430-31. But that was not properly regarded as a transfer of title; 
it was a means of enforcing a general regulatory statute. The raisins were, in effect, 
contraband; they had been produced in violation of a valid regulation. In doctrinal 
terms, Horne, like Mahon (at least in Justice Holmes’ view) is a general regulation 
case masquerading as a specific regulatory taking and thus does not alter the 
conclusion that general regulatory action does not violate any constitutional right and 
thus should not be considered takings. In figurative terms, the issue in the case 
involved a product grown on agricultural land, and so the decision only moderately 
alters the observation that most general regulatory-takings cases involve real property. 
See id. at 2430-31. 
 271. FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 2. 
 272. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67-68 (1979) (holding that no 
compensation is required when law prohibits the sale of eagle feathers, thereby 
substantially reducing their value to the owners); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 
633, 657 (1887) (holding that no compensation is required where a state prohibition 
on the sale of alcohol reduced the value of the owner’s brewery from $10,000 to 
$2500). The Mugler decision turned, to some extent, on the ground that the state found 
alcohol to be a public nuisance, but this rationale would apply to the prohibition of 
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of time or scope of coverage for copyrights or patents, must it pay the 
owners for the resulting loss of value?273 The same point can be made 
about the right to practice one’s profession. Suppose the government 
prohibits suicide assistance, gambling, prostitution, cryogenic 
chamber therapy,274 or lying down on railroad tracks therapy.275 Must 
those who earned a living from these fields now be compensated for 
their loss?276 
The pragmatic reason why compensation for prohibited 
substances and discontinued practices cannot be provided is apparent; 
                                                   
any substance or profession. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 673. In reaching its decision, the 
Court distinguished Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1972), which held that 
the state must compensate the owner of land it flooded when it built a dam. See 
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668. Writing for the Court, Justice John Marshall Harlan said: 
“The question in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., arose under the state’s power of eminent 
domain; while the question now before us arises under what are, strictly, the police 
powers of the State, exerted for the protection of the health, morals, and safety of the 
people.” Id. A dam might be justified on grounds of public health or safety, however. 
The real difference in the case is that in Mugler the state was protecting health and 
safety through general legislation, whereas in Pumpelly it flooded the land of a 
specific individual. See id. 
 273. See generally Shubha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings 
for Intellectual Property: The Path Left Open After College Savings v. Florida 
Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637 (2000) (arguing that intellectual property merits 
equal treatment with land, but limiting the recommendation to specific takings, such 
as a copyright or trade secret). 
 274. ActiveCryo Cryotherapy Chamber, VACUACTIVUS, https://vacuactivus. 
com/cryotherapy-capsule-active-cryosauna [https://perma.cc/FQ3X-JRDA] (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2019). 
 275. CBC NEWS, Indonesians Lie on Train Rails for “Therapy”, (Aug. 2, 
2011, 9:49 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/indonesians-lie-on-train-rails-for-
therapy-1.1044184 [https://perma.cc/DG7Y-9WE5]. 
 276. Another example is the group of legal restrictions that led to the virtual 
disappearance of the urban horse. As late as the 1870s and 80s, the streets of American 
cities were filled with horses hauling freight, carrying people, and pulling the 
horsecars and omnibuses that comprised the mass transit systems of that time. See 
CLAY MCSHANE & JOEL A. TARR, THE HORSE IN THE CITY: LIVING MACHINES IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 57-101 (2007). By the 1930s, they were largely gone, together 
with the extensive stables that had been built for them and the teamsters who often 
had acquired significant levels of specialized skills. See id. at 165-81. Additional 
restrictions continue to be imposed, and horse owners complain, but no compensation 
for their losses is proposed, or likely to be forthcoming. See Katherine Clarke, City 
Carriage Horse Stable Owners in Crisis Over Whether to Sell Before de Blasio’s 
Proposed Ban, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 6, 2014), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/city-stable-owners-crisis-sell-ban-
article-1.2036487 [https://perma.cc/U4W7-PCTZ]; Lianne Hart, Houston Horse 
Owners Saddle Up Against Law, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 29, 2006), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-01-29/news/0601290393_1_horse-owners-
riding-fourth-largest-city [https://perma.cc/E94E-6XPB]. 
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any such requirement would burden or preclude the legal changes that 
are necessary in a modern society. The normative reason is apparent 
as well. Some people sustain losses as a result of legal change, but 
others recognize gains, and there is no apparent reason to favor one 
group over the other; rather, the conflict between them is what our 
political process is designed to resolve. It would appear that this well-
accepted principle has troubled the Supreme Court in one specific type 
of case, that is, where a general governmental action decreases the 
value of real property. As Fischel points out, however, no doctrinal 
principle or normative consideration in our modern law of property 
justifies this separate treatment.277 The Court speaks often, in all 
regulatory-takings cases, about “investment backed expectations.” 
But there is no reason why investment in land should be favored over 
investment in any other form of property. People invest in chattels, 
factory buildings, and in intellectual property as often as they do in 
land. If there is any normative argument to be made, it would be in 
favor of people’s training for a particular career, since that represents 
lost time that is in some sense irreplaceable. Frank Michelman 
attempts to justify the Mahon decision in terms of the “demoralization 
costs” resulting from the coal company’s loss of bargained-for 
rights.278 But mining companies, real estate developers, and New York 
City landlords hardly seem like particularly sensitive types of people. 
Losing the benefits of one’s invention or the ability to make a living 
from one’s chosen career would seem to have a greater potential to 
demoralize, but these types of losses are virtually never compensated. 
Quite possibly, the favored status of land is simply an atavism, a 
holdover from the feudal era when land ownership was genuinely 
different because it conferred status and constituted the means by 
which the central government established control over its territory. 
But those times are long past; we now have an administrative state, 
where government authority is exercised by appointed, hierarchically 
organized officials. Land remains valuable, but its value is far 
exceeded by the value of machinery, financial instruments, intellectual 
property, and all the other forms of property that lie outside the ambit 
of the regulatory-takings doctrine and could not conceivably be 
brought within it.279 
                                                   
 277. FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 2. 
 278. Michelman, supra note 19, at 1212–14. 
 279. Larger questions about why property ownership should be treated 
differently from religious observance, self-expression, or other values lie outside the 
scope of this Article. The familiar arguments are that the zone of autonomy that we 
recognize for individual liberty of various kinds does not apply to property. Some 
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B. Protection of Property Owners 
While it does not protect any conceptually coherent or normative 
category of property, the right to property on which general 
regulatory-takings decisions rely does protect a recognizable group of 
people. This group, of course, is property owners and specifically 
landowners. General regulatory-takings decisions favor landowners 
over the public, which includes those who do not own property and 
may be able to obtain legislation that favors competing interests 
through the political process. The question is why courts should inject 
themselves into such controversies and tilt the political playing field 
to the landowners’ advantage.  
Nothing in constitutional law or public policy supports this 
result. Far from being a “discrete and insular” minority,280 
landowners—if a minority at all––are broadly dispersed throughout 
                                                   
property, such as a person’s clothing, souvenirs, and personal work products can be 
placed within this zone, see, e.g., DAN-COHEN, supra note 263, at 264-301; see also 
Rose, supra note 263, at 6, but property rights in general, as we conceive them, 
necessarily extend far beyond the ambit of the individual. They involve the control of 
social resources and, consequently, the ability to exercise direct control over other 
individuals. To impair the ability of the citizenry, acting through its elected 
representatives, to define and control such rights is to undermine our basic system of 
government. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the Supreme Court has 
definitively rejected the idea that the Constitution limits the regulation of private 
property by means of generally applicable enactments. The argument here is that that 
there is no reason to carve out an exception for real property from this well-accepted 
principle. The fact that real property is typically the object of specific government 
action, whether direct or regulatory, and that such action is subject to constitutional 
limits does not justify differential treatment of this property when it is subject to a 
different type of governmental action.  
 280. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For 
a discussion of this formulation, and account of its relationship to democratic theory, 
see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 77-88, 135-79 (1980); 
Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 
YALE L.J. 1287 (1982). For the suggestion that it is diffuse groups, not insular ones, 
who may be in most need of protection, see generally Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond 
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985). The thrust of Professor Ackerman’s 
argument is that we should not ignore “the anonymous and diffuse victims of poverty 
and sexual discrimination who find it most difficult to protect their fundamental 
interests through effective political organization.” Id. at 745. His point may be well 
taken, although it has been disputed. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. 
Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead?—Reflections on Affirmative Action and the 
Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 685 (1991). In any event, 
property owners do not fit within Ackerman’s “victims of poverty and discrimination” 
any more than they fit within Carolene Products’ “discrete and insular” minorities. 
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4; Ackerman, supra at 745. 
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the nation and entirely integrated into its society. They have full access 
to the political process and, as people who have been able to purchase 
a valuable asset, are likely to possess resources that enable them to 
participate effectively. The mining companies lost out to residential 
home owners in Pennsylvania, landlords lost out to tenants in New 
York State, and developers and residential users lost out to 
environmentalists in South Carolina and Wisconsin. But there are 
many other states and other circumstances where the political 
competition has produced the opposite result. 
To emphasize this somewhat obvious point, consider Loretto, a 
constitutional challenge to a public policy decision favoring the 
economic interests of tenants over the economic interests of landlords. 
This is a conflict that arises in a variety of situations, including 
habitability, rent withholding, termination, eviction, security deposits, 
and rent control. In New York State, tenants seem to wield significant 
amounts of political influence and are able to obtain legislation 
favorable to their interests. In other states, the balance may be more 
likely to favor landlords and other property owners. A decision 
striking down the New York law as overly burdensome to landlords 
would then open the question of whether different laws in Nebraska 
or Arizona should be struck down as overly burdensome to tenants. 
In order to choose one of two politically competing groups, to 
strike down general legislation or regulation favoring the interests of 
landlords, or, in the other decisions, of mining companies, developers, 
and recreational land owners, some presumption in favor of these 
groups must be invoked. Since, as argued in the previous Part, there is 
nothing particularly special about land as opposed to other forms of 
property and, as argued here, there is nothing special about either 
landowners or property owners as a group, the presumption must come 
from somewhere else. When the general regulatory-takings decisions 
are examined in this light, it appears that the presumption comes from 
an underlying hostility to administrative governance. Landowners 
derive their rights from common law, the body of judicially fashioned 
doctrine that the United States inherited from England and developed 
incrementally while maintaining its basic legal structure. 
Environmentalists, consumers, and tenants derive their rights from 
regulatory laws whose explicit goal is to replace the common law with 
different rules, reflecting different values.281 Those values are the 
                                                   
 281. The law involved in Mahon favored residential homeowners, to be sure, 
but, in the context of that situation, they can be assimilated to consumers in the sense 
that they were individuals opposing the contractual rights that a large corporation had 
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products of modern industrial society in at least two senses. First, they 
provide protection for people against hazards and oppressions that did 
not exist in pre-modern society. Second, they have emerged from 
modern sensibilities regarding the normative value of ordinary people 
as opposed to economic and social elites, of nature as opposed to 
development, and of conscious social policy as opposed to the 
maintenance of tradition. These values are generally not reflected in 
common law because they post-date its formation.282 
At various times, the Supreme Court has evinced a decided 
hostility toward administrative governance, perhaps due to political 
conservatism, perhaps because the Justices on the Court have 
identified with economic and social elites, and perhaps because it 
prefers established law to legal change. This hostility was most 
apparent during the Lochner Era, when the Court struck down a 
variety of laws that emerged from the Progressive Movement. Those 
decisions were repudiated as having no doctrinal basis, and as 
reflecting values that were at the very least contestable, and thus 
subject to political determination. At present, however, that hostility 
seems to have re-emerged in the general regulatory-takings cases. But, 
once again, they have no doctrinal or normative basis.  
The Court’s reliance of the idea of investment-backed 
expectations can be examined once again in light of these 
observations. In cases of a specific regulatory taking, the principle is 
justifiable because it is one way of measuring the potential loss to 
individuals who have no access the political process. But when general 
governmental action is involved, landowners should be required to 
submit themselves to that process along with everybody else. 
Undoubtedly, the policy of investment supports economic 
development, but there is no reason to assume that the nation as a 
whole favors development over other values. Property owners may 
have expectations about the limits of government action, but other 
groups of citizens may have expectations that the government will 
protect them from substandard products, oppressive landlords, and 
environmental degradation or catastrophe. There is no normative basis 
or reason for the courts to intervene in this debate in favor of one side 
or the other. 
                                                   
obtained against them and that were somewhat analogous to a waiver of liability. In 
any event, the case fits the larger pattern because the more economically powerful 
party derived its rights claim from common law, while the economically 
disadvantaged party derived its rights claim from a regulatory statute.  
 282. See EDWARD L. RUBIN, Beyond Camelot: Rethinking Politics and Law for 
the Administrative State 25-29 (2005); Rubin, supra note 87, at 113-29.  
 The Mistaken Idea of General Regulatory Takings 285 
CONCLUSION 
There can be little doubt that settled legal rules that allow people 
to hold, use, and transfer rights to tangible and intangible things are 
essential to the operation of a modern commercial economy. There 
can be equally little doubt that collective action by society is essential 
to prevent those who achieve the vast power that such rules provide 
from oppressing their employees, misleading consumers, and 
destroying the environment. Balancing those interests, and providing 
the overall coordination that will produce general benefits to the 
society from that balance, is a task that we assign, for better or worse, 
to the political process. We constrain or limit that process only when 
we can identify some definitive right that represents an independent 
and more important value, something that we do not want to see traded 
or compromised in the ordinary course of our collective deliberations. 
When the government takes action against specified individuals, 
whether to deprive those individuals of liberty or property, we 
recognize a right that constrains such action. This is the right to due 
process. It provides that disadvantages may not be imposed on 
individuals unless two conditions are met: First, the disadvantage must 
be established by the political process, that is, a democratically based 
or authorized decision, and second, that a fair procedure, implemented 
by an independent adjudicator, has been used to determine that the 
particular individual belongs within the category of people on whom 
the disadvantage has been imposed. If the disadvantage involves 
liberty, these conditions must be met. But if it involves property, 
where individual rights are less central and social coordination more 
important, the government is granted a second option. It can take away 
an individual’s rights without showing that the individual belongs 
within a politically defined category as long as it compensates the 
individual for the market value of the property. In this case, the market 
replaces an independent adjudicator as an external control on arbitrary 
public power. 
When the government acts generally, however, there is no right 
that constrains its basic, established ability to alter or abolish property 
rights. In response to a dramatic shift in the balance between property 
rights and public regulation that occurred during the Progressive Era, 
however, the Supreme Court attempted to contrive a right of this sort. 
It decided that the common law property rights that had always been 
regarded as subject to statutory control were constitutionally 
protected, so that regulatory legislation was void unless it could 
demonstrate some exceptional justification. This anti-administrative 
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approach prevailed for the first third of the century but was decisively 
repudiated in 1937. 
The current Court has revived this same anti-administrative 
stance. In addition to enforcing the Clause as an adjunct to the 
recognized right of due process when the government takes action 
against specific pieces of property, it has decided that the Clause 
applies when the government reduces the value of property by general 
regulation. Because no basis for this right exists in our legal system, 
the cases that depend upon it have been fatally incoherent. They offer 
no comprehensible explanation of the property that is being protected 
and the property that remains fully subject to the political process, and 
they offer no rationale on which this distinction can be based. 
These decisions should be overturned. Doing so will not produce 
a major change in legal doctrine. Most of the takings cases, which 
involve specific government action, will remain in place. Moreover, 
reversal of the general regulatory-takings cases will not produce any 
sweeping practical effects, since the decisions have been limited to a 
few areas, mainly involving land, and have failed to articulate any 
general principle that would extend their reach. The application of the 
Takings Clause to general regulatory enactments is a legal error, a 
source of confusion, and an impediment to valid public policy, and it 
has no place in our legal system. 
 
